CORNELIUS NEPOS’

BOOK ON DISTINGUISHED GENERALS OF FOREIGN NATIONS

Translated by

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to my patient wife Maryse Ponchard-Hyatte for aid in preparation of the manuscript. To Dr. D. Thomas Benediktson, Professor Emeritus of Classics and former Dean of Henry Kendall College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Tulsa, sincere thanks for practical advice. Further, I acknowledge the valuable technical assistance given by my friend Tony A. Kenneybrew, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D. I am grateful to Oxford University Press and Editor Jacqueline Baker for granting permission to publish my translation of Cornelius Nepos’ *Vitae* edited by E.O. Winstedt (1904, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis).

Le Tréport, 2015
NOTE ON CORNELIUS NEPOS (CA. 99—CA. 24 B.C.) AND BIOGRAPHY

Cornelius Nepos’ voluminous *Lives of Distinguished Men*, both Romans and foreigners, originally comprised at least sixteen books or treatises on eight or more topics: four dealt with rulers, generals, poets, and historians, and scholars speculate that others included philosophers, legal experts, orators, and grammarians. The collection served in part, at the Republic’s close, to introduce on a large scale Greek biographical models into Latin literature. Time reduced his ambitious monument to a single book, *On Distinguished Generals of Foreign Nations (Liber de excellentibus ducibus exterarum gentium)*, along with fragments from the treatise on Latin historians and two lives (Cato the Elder and T. Pomponius Atticus, Nepos’ friend). Part of a letter addressed to Marcus Tullius Cicero survives, too. The extant *vitae*, except those of Cato and Atticus, derive for the most part from Greek sources.

Lost writings include a chronicle, or universal history, in three books; a collection of exemplary anecdotes on varied topics; another life of Cato the Elder and one of Cicero; poems; a work on geography.

We know little about the first important biographer in Latin. A native of Cisalpine Gaul, he frequented men of letters and influence in Rome. The tenor of his biographies in the political context of the declining Republic is consistently antidemocratic. He upholds traditional Roman values, the “Fidelity and Peace and Honor and old-fashioned / Modesty and […] Manliness” that Horace later celebrates in his *Secular Chant* 57-58.

The volume on foreign generals, chiefly Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., functions as one panel of a diptych, so to speak, of which the other, lost panel represented Roman commanders: the author invites readers to compare one with the other and judge from among the heroes which deserve the highest praise (see *Hannibal* 13.4). Unlike Plutarch in his *Parallel Lives*, Nepos does not arrange by pairs a non-Roman and a Roman for comparison’s sake. Further, unlike some Latin authors, notably Cicero, he does not preclude—or so it might seem—the superiority of Romans as a whole. He calls attention, indirectly at times, to the Roman civil wars of his century in pointing out the ancient Greek armies’ lawlessness and the futility of the states’ fratricidal rivalries (e.g., *Eumenes* 8.2-3, * Agesilaius* 4.1-2 and 5.1-4).

Today’s general reader will probably appreciate the concision with which Cornelius Nepos, a talented story-teller, covers the centuries of the Greek city-states’ rise and fall in military might, the fight for supremacy among Alexander the Great’s successors, and the first two Punic Wars. Within this broad sweep of history, the commandants’ careers frequently overlap so as to constitute in good part interwoven narratives rather than discrete life-stories. The author’s dramatic recounting makes events of individual and historical interest particularly memorable—for instance, the Athenian Themistocles’ diplomatic triumph and downfall (*Themistocles* 6.1-8.1), Alcibiades’ triumphal return to Athens and reversal of fortune (*Alcibiades* 5.6-7.1), and the assassination in Syracuse of the hated ruler Dion, formerly honored for his virtues and courage (*Dion* 8.1-10.3).

In conformity with the ethical nature of ancient biography, Cornelius Nepos pronounces an encomium at times or, at others, censure. His approach to each life varies according to how he views the principal actor’s character. The Theban Epaminondas and Pausanias the Spartan offer contrasting types of the most praiseworthy and most damnable characters in the writer’s judgment. The distinction is not always clear. In the case of Themistocles, the moral representation is ambiguous: the deeds that won him fame as commander and statesman reveal,
as in other aspects of his life, his duplicitous nature. Nepos’ description of Phocion the Athenian stands out with regard to its ambiguity: he first praises him for his integrity owing to which he was called ‘The Good,’ then he relates in detail how the same man betrayed a friend in need and, likewise, his native city—truly grave offenses. The biographies deal not so much with the foreign commanders’ careers and deeds as their different characters from a conservative Roman moralist’s view. The exemplary content of the narratives ranks above historical facts or acts. Again, in his account of Phocion, the biographer states that his subject is not remembered—by historians, one supposes—for great military feats. If Nepos includes him among the memorable foreign generals, it is probably because of his exceptional, albeit inconsistent, character. (Written a century later, Plutarch’s comprehensive life of Phocion rehabilitates him as noteworthy general and statesman.)

Cornelius Nepos, whom the poet Catullus applauds as a chronicler, refuses as a biographer to record abundant historical details lest he bore readers; yet he recognizes the need to provide some historical context for the sake of readers lacking in knowledge of Greek literature or history (see Pelopidas 1.1). The gallery of illustrious commanders includes certain non-Greeks, one of whom, Datames, a lesser-known figure, requires a fair amount of contextual information (see Timotheus 4.6). The extremely brief sketches of warrior-sovereigns in the chapter Concerning Kings serve, on the other hand, little more than as cross-references to full vitae in the lost book on foreign rulers in the same collection. Scholars have noted numerous historical inaccuracies reported here. Such errors, a few of which are indicated in the translation’s footnotes, may derive from Nepos’ source texts, which he seldom names and perhaps knew only secondhand, or from scribal misinterpretation or glosses, or the author himself may have introduced them. In any event, with a general readership in mind, he typically reports a single or a few interesting anecdotes and examples illustrating the character of a legendary hero from the distant past, and he provides only enough of a historical setting for readers to measure his worth.

The biographer usually states what traits or acts he finds praiseworthy or damnable. In order to appreciate his approval or censure, today’s reader must be aware of the significance in ancient societies of codes and practices of hospitality, friendship, oath, burial, reward and punishment, allegiance, tyranny, piety, and sanctuary as well as traditional lifestyles. Essential to the question of value, too, is a problem concerning fame: military achievements bring renown to commanders, but to what extent does Fortune contribute to their successes? The biographer’s evaluation of Alcibiades’ celebrated victories treats this problem (see Thrasybulus 1.1-5). In the case of Lysander the Spartan, Chance makes possible his most notable feat of arms (Lysander 1.1-2, Conon 1.2-3). Fame itself may produce misfortune. Alcibiades’ renown as a general incapable of failure explains, according to his biographer, why the Athenians removed him from command and he went into exile (Alcibiades 7.1-3). Many an eminent leader falls victim to his own good fortune, which makes him arrogant, selfishly ambitious, imprudent, or hated.

Nepos associates character, even more than military exploits, with the best sort of fame, which is fully deserved because it depends upon the person alone. Although once ostracized, the Athenian Aristides, called ‘The Just,’ merits such fame. Most often the good die happily—or, at least, not miserably—and receive public honors, for they are loved on account of their goodness. The reader can often identify infamy, a bad reputation by reason of bad character, in looking at the subject’s end: Phocion, who refused to defend his city against alien occupation, is condemned to death for treason, and slaves bury him. But the death and burial scenes may present contradictory indications: paradoxically, Phocion boasts that his death sentence—a mark of
infamy—gives proof of his greatness, since very many eminent Athenians shared the same fate, and after the tyrant Dion’s assassination, his countrymen who hated him while he lived acclaim him as the man who liberated them, and they inter him with full honors.

Some of the most worthy generals engaged in public affairs—Hannibal of Carthage and the Athenians Miltiades and Timotheus—suffer the ingratitude of their native states. Their examples perhaps represent Epicurean doctrine promoting detachment from political activity. The Corinthian Timoleon serves as a counter-example: after having liberated the Syracusans from tyranny, he relinquishes his position of power and enjoys, as a private citizen, their lasting goodwill and respect. Among the many lives, the repetition of critical situations offers contrasting ethical consideration. Dramatic scenes that invite comparison include the people’s markedly different reception of the feeble old man, their former glorious leader, in the conclusion to the lives of Timoleon and Phocion, the hero’s reflection on his opponent’s or his own capture and death (Timoleon 2.2, Eumenes 11.4-5, Hannibal 12.5), and the diametrically opposed reactions of the generals to their compatriots’ ingratitude (Themistocles 10.2, Cimon 3.2, Alcibiades 4.5-7, Timotheus 3.5, Epaminondas 7.1-5).

We might add that even though women do not participate in the heroes’ exploits, on occasion they perform a significant gesture in defending, or defying, a son, brother, husband, or sexual partner. Some instances involve confinement or exclusion (Pausanias 5.3, Timoleon 1.5), and they illustrate a sort of ‘virile’ virtue. Others exemplify protectiveness and nurturing (Cimon 1.2-4, Alcibiades 10.6, Dion 8.4-5, Iphicrates 3.2-4, Eumenes 6.3). Notwithstanding, the biographer describes sentimental attachment chiefly between males.

Along with commonplaces on Fortune, Fame, and Nature, many of the following topics reappear from life to life as the common stock of the ancient biographical genre: the subject’s city, parentage, and social rank; upbringing and youthful character traits; physical appearance; dress; special talent or training; intellectual education; introduction to military service; love; marriage and offspring; objectives, obstacles, triumph, and failure; command of campaigns or home defense; public offices and services; court trials; exile; dealings with fellow citizens, allies, and enemies; travel and residence abroad; public and private lifestyles; military stratagems and innovations; repartees and speeches; recognition or ingratitude on the home country’s part or that of foreigners; betrayal; death and burial; specific virtues and vices; and written sources. The life-stories may take up as many of these recurring topics as the author’s varying biographical models or inclinations permit. Their concision is such that at times one finds only the briefest mention of certain military feats that made the generals worth remembering.
CATULLUS DEDICATES A VOLUME OF POETRY TO CORNELIUS NEPOS

Little book of verse, to whom do you now go,
    Your tiny scroll-tips polished smooth with pumice?
Why, to you, Cornelius, for once you thought
    My playful poems somewhat more than worthless,
You who then alone among the Romans dared
    Record the world’s whole history in only
Three, by Jove! most erudite papyrus rolls.
    Pray take this book, however slight its value.
O my Lyric Muse, bestow upon it breath
    Beyond our brief-enduring mortal passage.

Catullus 1.1-10, trans. R. Hyatte
NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION


Usually translators do not call attention to their agency between the lines, so to say, as interpreters. Consequently, a reader may have the impression that their rendering simply reproduces the original in another language. The following literary translation seeks, however, to maintain a critical distance for the reader between the original and interpreted texts. So that the reader can recognize clearly interventions and divergences, italicized words or phrases in the body of the translation indicate corrections (e.g., from Latin variants), an editor’s conjecture different from a reading incorporated in Winstedt’s text, and clarification, additions, or transpositions on the translator’s part. On the other hand, occasional omission of *et*, *-que*, *nam*, *namque*, and *enim* is not noted.

Although Nepos recognizes that some or even most of his readers may not be familiar with Greek letters, he writes a few untranslated Greek words, such as *chiliarchus*, *gynaeconitis*, *mora*, *(in) Timoleonta*, and *hemerodromoe*. None the less, he usually does not hesitate to rename foreign institutions, offices, customs, and gods according to Roman near equivalents.

The mixed Greek and Latin forms of Greek names in the translation correspond for the most part to their nominative case in the base manuscript—*Alexander v. Cassandrus, Crateros v. Ptolemaeus*, etc.

The translator has not attempted to reproduce Nepos’ frequent word-play (see, e.g., footnotes to *Agesilaus 6.1* and *Hannibal 6.2*).

At the beginning of each biography a roman numeral indicates its place in the sequence of twenty-three chapters. The numeral is in bold-faced italics along with the general’s name or subject that follows it. Within each chapter an arabic numeral in bold-faced italics marks the beginning of a new paragraph or section, and an italicized arabic numeral, the beginning of a subsection or sentence. The Latin manuscripts do not contain the numbers or names.

All dates are B.C./B.C.E. They sometimes vary from one modern source of information to another, as occurred with Nepos’ authorities (see *Hannibal 13.1*).
CORNELIUS NEPOS’
BOOK ON DISTINGUISHED GENERALS OF FOREIGN NATIONS

PREFACE

1 I do not doubt, Atticus, that many will judge this sort of writing trivial and unworthy of the most eminent men’s roles when they read it reported who taught Epaminondas music or find mentioned among his achievements that he danced well and played the flute skillfully. 2 But in general they will be readers unschooled in Greek letters who believe nothing proper unless it agrees with their own customs. 3 If they come to understand that not everyone considers the same actions honorable or disgraceful but that forefathers’ precedents serve to judge all things, then it will not surprise them to see us follow the Greeks’ mores in publishing their virtues. 4 Indeed, Cimon, a very distinguished Athenian, did not behave shamefully in marrying his own sister inasmuch as his fellow citizens made use of the same practice. But on the other hand, it is of course considered impious according to our mores. In Greece it is thought praiseworthy for young men to have had as many male lovers as possible. In Sparta no unmarried woman, no matter how noble, is above accepting pay to go to a dinner party. 5 Nearly everywhere in Greece the title of victor at the Olympic games ranked among the high honors, and in fact no one among the Greeks thought it disgraceful to go on the stage and make a public spectacle of oneself. Among all these acts we regard some as disreputable, others as common and far from honorable. 6 Conversely, they consider shameful a good many practices judged honorable according to our customs. For example, who among the Romans is ashamed to take his wife to a dinner party? Or whose mistress of the household does not occupy the most accessible part of the dwelling and appear in public? 7 In Greece it is quite different for a matron: she goes solely to dinner parties of near relatives, and she resides only in the private part of the house called the ‘gynaeconitis,’ or women’s quarters, to which no men but close family members have access. 8 But both the volume’s scope and my haste to develop the subject that I have undertaken prohibit me from pursuing this course of inquiry further here. Therefore let us now turn to the matter in hand as I relate in this book the careers of distinguished foreign generals.

1 See Cimon 1.2.
2 Ad cenam eat = ‘goes to a dinner party’; a variant gives ad scenam eat = ‘goes on the stage.’ Both readings anticipate related actions in the preface, but neither is confirmed by what we know of woman’s role in Spartan society. In Athens courtesans and paid female entertainers attended dinner parties, but not wives except in the case noted a few sentences below.
I. MILTIADES

I Miltiades, an Athenian, son of Cimon. When owing to the antiquity of his family, his forefathers’ glory, and his own dignity he was preeminent among all; and when he reached an age at which his fellow citizens judged that they could not only entertain high hopes regarding him but could indeed have confidence that he would _continue to exhibit those qualities they already recognized in him_; it happened _then_ that the Athenians decided to send settlers to the Thracian Chersonese. 2 Since the group of qualified men was very large and many sought to join in the emigration, some selected from among them were sent to Delphi to consult the oracle of Apollo concerning who would serve best as _their_ leader. For at that time the Thracians, on whom they would have to wage war, held those regions. 3 The Pythia instructed them expressly to choose Miltiades as their commander: if they did, _their_ undertaking would succeed. 4 On account of the oracle’s response Miltiades set out for the Chersonese with a fleet _and_ a select armed force. When he reached Lemnus, he wanted to bring the island’s inhabitants under the Athenians’ sway, and he asked the Lemnians to do so of their own accord. 5 Mocking him they answered that they would comply when he, departing from _his_ home by ship, arrived at Lemnus carried by the north wind, which in fact meets head-on those setting out from Athens. Since time did not permit Miltiades to delay, he steered a course for _his_ destination and arrived at the Chersonese. 2 After having scattered the foreign troops there in a short time, he became master of the whole region that he had sought; he secured suitable places with strongholds; he peopled the arable land with the large number _of men accompanying_ him, and he made them rich through frequent forays. 2 In that, prudence aided him no less than good fortune. After he had subdued the enemies’ armies thanks to _his_ soldiers’ valor, he managed affairs with the utmost fairness, and he decided to remain there. 3 Among the settlers he enjoyed the same consideration as that of a king, although without the title, nor did he achieve this more as a result of legitimate authority than through _his_ justice. None the less, he fulfilled _his_ obligations with respect to the Athenians from whom he had departed. Consequently, he maintained uninterrupted command due to the volition both of the men who had sent him and those with whom he had set out. 4 After the Chersonese had been settled in that manner, he returned to Lemnus and called on the Lemnians to hand over _their_ city to him as agreed. They had said, in effect, that they would surrender when he arrived there carried from _his_ home by the north wind—but _now_ he said that _his_ home was the Chersonese, _to the north-east_! 5 The Carians occupied Lemnus then, but events had turned out contrary to what they expected; still, confounded not because of _their_ own promise but _their_ enemies’ good luck, they did not dare to resist, and they left the island. With similar success he brought the remaining islands called the Cyclades under Athens’ domination. 3 In the same period the Persian king Darius I, who had _his_ army transported from Asia into Europe, was determined to wage war on the Scythians. _His_ troops crossed the Lower Danube by means of a bridge _of boats_ which he had built. To guard the bridge in his absence, he left foremost men whom he had brought with him from Ionia and Aeolia; to them he had granted permanent authority individually over the cities in those _regions_. 2 Thus he thought that he might most easily maintain under his control the Greek-speakers living in Asia _Minor_ if he turned over

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3 The Athenians colonized the Thracian Chersonese in 561. Miltiades was put in charge of administering the colony in 518. The biographer, or perhaps his source, attributes in part to Miltiades in the first two paragraphs what an uncle of the same name had done earlier.

4 513.
their cities to the keeping of his associates, who would have no hope of staying in power after his downfall. Miltiades was among those entrusted to protect the bridge. 3 After numerous messengers had reported that Darius was losing the campaign and the Scythians were bearing down on him, Miltiades urged the bridge’s guardians not to lose this opportunity offered by Fortune to liberate Greece: 4 if Darius perished along with the troops that he had transported, not only would Europe be safe but those, too, of Greek descent living in Asia Minor would be free from danger and domination by the Persians. And they could accomplish it readily: with the bridge severed, in a few days either the weapons of the king’s enemies or the lack of resources would finish him off. 5 Although many assented to his plan, Histiaeus, a Milesian, argued against carrying it out: it was not equally expedient for those wielding supreme authority and the common people, since the former maintained their domination through Darius’ sovereignty, and with the king destroyed, their compatriots would drive them from power and punish them. Therefore, he was so opposed to the others’ plan that he thought nothing more useful for them than to reinforce the Persians’ rule. 6 When most of those present agreed with Histiaeus’ view, Miltiades had no doubt that his scheme would reach the king’s ears, since so many were privy to it; hence he left the Chersonese and took up residence again in Athens.5 Even though his plan did not prevail, it is none the less highly praiseworthy, since it favored the freedom of all above his own dominance.

4 But after Darius’ return to Asia from Europe, his intimates urged him to bring Greece under his control. Alleging as a reason that he was the Athenians’ enemy since with their assistance the Ionians had stormed Sardis and slaughtered his garrisons, 5 he prepared a fleet of five hundred ships in charge of which he placed Datis and Artaphernes, and he gave them two hundred thousand infantrymen and ten thousand horse. 2 Having landed their vessels at Euboea, these royal commanders quickly captured Eretria, carried off all its citizens, and sent them to the king in Asia. Thereafter they entered Attica and led their troops into the plain of Marathon, about ten Roman miles from the city. 3 Very much troubled owing to such great turbulence so near by, the Athenians sought help from Sparta alone, and they sent there Phidippus, a courier of the sort who can run all day called ‘hemerodromoe,’ to announce how urgently they needed aid. 4 At home, on the other hand, they chose ten generals to lead the army, one of whom was Miltiades. 7 The commanders argued a good deal among themselves whether to establish their defense within the city walls or to go meet the enemy and decide the issue on the battlefield. 5 Miltiades alone insisted most strongly that they set up a camp right away: if they did so, the citizens would take heart inasmuch as they saw that their valor was not mistrusted, and, furthermore, due to the same circumstance, the enemy would be slower to act if they observed such a small number of troops dare to oppose them.

5 At the time Plataea was the only city assisting the Athenians. It sent one thousand soldiers. Thus, with their arrival the number of armed men amounted to ten thousand, and they burned with an extraordinary desire to fight, 2 because of which Miltiades prevailed against his colleagues. Consequently the Athenians, persuaded by his authority, led the troops out of the city and set up a military camp in a suitable place. 3 Then, the following day, having drawn up their line of battle in a somewhat obstructed area at the foot of a mountain, they engaged in battle with

5 492.
6 499.
7 The Athenians elected yearly ten commanders (here, Latin praetores) in charge of the armed forces and the city’s defense.
this plan in mind: both the mountain height behind them would protect them, and the disposition of the trees, which were scattered in many spots, would prevent the large number of the enemy’s horse from hemming them in. Even though Datis realized that his forces were at a disadvantage in the site, none the less, relying on their size he wanted to do battle, all the more so since he judged it expedient to fight before the Spartans arrived to add their support. Therefore he placed in the battle line one hundred thousand infantrymen and ten thousand horsemen, and he engaged in combat, wherein the Athenians were so much more valiant that they crushed ten times their own number of enemy soldiers, and they terrified the Persians to the extent that they headed not for their camp but their vessels. Up to now nothing more remarkable than this battle has occurred: in fact never has so small an army overthrown such large armed forces.

6 It seems pertinent to our subject to point out what sort of reward the Athenians presented to Miltiades for this victory: from it one can recognize rather easily the same nature that all states share. Just as, for instance, honors among the Roman people in former times were rare and simple and, for that very reason, glorious, yet now are lavish but trivial, so we find it to have been once with the Athenians. 3 They bestowed such honor on Miltiades for having liberated Athens and all of Greece that when the battle of Marathon was painted in the portico called Poecile, his image was placed foremost among the ten commanders, and he is shown exhorting the soldiers and ordering them to join battle. 4 After the same people had gained greater authority and the liberality of their magistrates had corrupted them, they voted to honor Demetrius of Phalerum with three hundred statues.

7 After that battle the Athenians turned over to Miltiades a fleet of seventy ships to chastise the Greek islands that had aided the Persians. During his command he compelled many of them to return to their duty, and some he overcame by force of arms. 2 Since from among the latter he could not reconcile the island of Parus through negotiation, for it was arrogant because of its might, he led his troops from the ships, enclosed the city within siege works and deprived it of all supplies, and then came close to its walls after having constructed siege sheds and mobile galleries. Just as he was about to come into possession of the city, far away on the continent a forest, visible from the island, caught fire at night due to some unknown circumstance. When the townspeople and the assailants saw the flames, both surmised that it was a signal produced by the Persian king’s marines. 4 As a result the Parians were deterred from surrendering, and Miltiades, afraid that the royal fleet was approaching, burned the siege works that he had built, and then, with just as many ships as at his departure from Athens, he returned there, much to his fellow citizens’ displeasure. Consequently he was charged with treason: his accusers said that although he could have stormed Parus, he withdrew, leaving the job unfinished, because the Persian king had bribed him. At the time he was infirm on account of wounds that he had received in attacking the city. Therefore, since he could not speak in his own defense, his brother Stesagoras made a speech for him. 6 After the case had been examined, he was acquitted of the capital charge but was fined for damages assessed at fifty talents, as much as arming the fleet had cost. Unable to pay the amount just then, he went to prison, and he met his death there.

8 Although the Athenians charged him with wrongdoing at Parus, there was, however, another reason why they condemned him: owing to Pisistratus’ tyranny some years earlier, they regarded with great apprehension their compatriots who wielded too much political power.

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8 The battle took place in 490.
9 489.
10 Capital cases may result in a death sentence or loss of rights of citizenship.
Miltiades had been much engaged in military commands and major affairs, it seemed impossible for him to become an ordinary citizen, especially since the exercise of authority appeared to attract him time and again. During all the years spent in the Chersonese, he had maintained absolute power without interruption, and he had been called a tyrant, but a just one. Indeed, he had obtained power not by means of force but through the volition of his own people, and he retained it through his goodness. Still, all who have permanent sovereignty in a state used to freedom are both called and considered tyrants. But Miltiades showed exceptional kindness and an amazing affability, too, in that no one was so lowly as not to have access to him; he exerted great authority among all the Greek-speaking states, he had an excellent reputation, he earned the highest praise in military matters. Noting these points, the people preferred to see that innocent man of renown punished rather than for them to live any longer in fear of him.
II. THEMISTOCLES

1 Themistocles, an Athenian, son of Neocles. He effaced the moral defects of his early youth through his splendid virtues to such an extent that no one is deemed his better and few, his equal. But we should start at the beginning. 2 His father Neocles, an aristocrat, married an Acarnanian of Athenian citizenship who bore Themistocles. Since his parents disapproved of him both because of his rather wanton lifestyle and disregard for the family’s fortune, his father disinherited him. This dishonor did not demoralize him but in fact rallied him: 3 judging that only by means of the utmost diligence could he erase it, he devoted himself wholly to public affairs while striving quite conscientiously to gain friends and a good reputation. He was often engaged in trials of private citizens, frequently he stepped forward in the public assembly; no important undertaking was conducted without his participation; he discovered quickly what actions were useful, he explained them with ease in speaking, 4 nor was he less enterprising in carrying out plans than in conceiving them, since, as Thucydides says, he formed opinions most accurately with respect to present matters, and, moreover, he predicted future ones very shrewdly. Consequently, he became renowned in a short time.

2 He first engaged in politics when the people chose him as commander in the war with Corcyra: he made his city more intrepid not only with regard to that war but to future conflicts besides. 2 For example, whereas the public funds deriving from the silver mines were squandered every year due to the magistrates’ distribution of largesse, he persuaded the people to have a fleet of one hundred ships built with that money. 3 This was accomplished quickly, and with the fleet he first crushed Corcyra and, next, rendered the sea safe by hunting down pirates. In doing so, he made the Athenians wealthy and quite skilled in naval warfare as well. 4 Just how important it would be for the safety of all of Greece became clear during the Second Persian War. For when Xerxes I advanced against the whole of Europe both on land and at sea, he had more armed forces than anyone either before or afterwards: 5 his fleet included one thousand two hundred battleships accompanied by two thousand transports, and his land troops numbered seven hundred thousand foot soldiers and four hundred thousand cavalymen. 6 Once news of his approach had reached Greece and his forces were said to be seeking especially the Athenians on account of the battle at Marathon, Athens sent representatives to Delphi for advice on what measures to take. The Pythia answered those consulting her that they should protect themselves by means of wooden walls. 7 No one understood what the answer meant, but Themistocles persuaded the Athenians that Apollo advised them to place themselves and their goods in wooden walls, which the god meant by wooden walls. 8 Having approved this plan, they added another hundred triremes to the ships mentioned above, and they transported everything that could be removed to Salamis as well as Troezena; they handed over the citadel to priests and a few elders for performing the sacred rites, and they abandoned the rest of the city.

3 Many of the city-states disapproved of his plan, and they decided to fight on land. Therefore select soldiers were sent along with Leonidas, the Spartan king,11 to occupy Thermopylae and prevent the Persians from going any farther. Failing to withstand the enemy attack, they all perished there. 2 But the joint Greek fleet of three hundred ships, of which two hundred were Athenian, first clashed with the Persian king’s naval forces near Artemisium, between Euboea and the continent. Themistocles sought straits then so that the great number of

11 On the Spartan kingship, see Agesilaus 1.2-5.
enemy vessels would not surround him. 3 Here the Greeks withdrew from an indecisive battle, but all the same they did not dare to remain in that place, for they risked being pressed in front and behind if part of the enemy’s ships went around Euboea. 4 Consequently they left Artemisium and stationed their fleet near Salamis across from Athens.

4 On the other hand, following his victory at Thermopylae Xerxes straightway approached the defenseless city and destroyed it by fire after the slaughter of the priests whom he found in the citadel. 2 While the Greek marines, terribly frightened by the flames, did not venture to remain there, and the majority urged withdrawing to their homes and defending themselves inside city walls, Themistocles alone objected and said that if they stayed together, they could match the Persians, but if they dispersed, they would all perish, and he asserted this to be the case before Eurybiades, the Spartans’ leader serving as supreme commander then. 3 Since he failed to persuade him, at night he sent the most loyal of his slaves to report, in his name, to the Persian king that his adversaries were about to flee: 4 if they scattered, the war would require more time and effort to complete since the king would have to pursue them singly; if he attacked them immediately, he would crush them all in a short time. Thus he meant to force the unwilling Greeks to fight it out together. 5 After having heard this report the foreign king, not thinking it concealed any trickery, fought the next day in a place wholly disadvantageous to him but, on the contrary, very advantageous to his enemies, in such a narrow strait that he could not deploy the large number of his ships. Thus he was defeated even more due to Themistocles’ stratagem than to Greece’s arms.12

5 Although beaten, none the less he had so many troops remaining that with them he could still overwhelm his foes. He was tripped up a second time by the same man: fearing that the king would continue to fight, Themistocles informed him that the bridge which he had built over the Dardanelles was in danger of being broken up, which would prevent him from returning to Asia, and the king believed it. 2 And thus, by the same route that he had covered in six months to reach Europe, he returned to Asia in less than thirty days, and he deemed that Themistocles had saved rather than defeated him. 3 So, thanks to the foresight of a single man, Greece was liberated, and Asia yielded to Europe. This second victory, near Salamis, can be compared to the triumph at Marathon: in a similar fashion, there a small number of vessels got the better of the largest navy in man’s memory.

6 Themistocles played an important part in that war, and his peacetime role was no less so. For instance, while the port of Phalerum that the Athenians used was neither advantageous nor large, on his advice they constructed the triple port of the Piraeus and surrounded it with ramparts; as a result it rivaled the city itself in grandeur and surpassed it in usefulness. 2 Further, he had Athens’ walls rebuilt at his personal peril. For the Spartans seized upon the Persian invasions as sufficient reason for saying that no city outside of the Peloponnesus ought to have walls, lest there be fortified posts that the enemy might occupy, and they tried to make the Athenians stop construction. 3 Their aim was much different from what they wanted it to appear. The Athenians had acquired so much glory among all the Greeks because of their two victories, at Marathon and Salamis, that the Spartans recognized that they would have to contend with them for supremacy. 4 Therefore, they wanted them to be as weak as possible. When they heard that the walls were being constructed, they sent representatives to Athens to oppose it. In their presence the Athenians interrupted their work and said that they would send envoys to them

12 480, off the coast of Salamis.
regarding the matter. Themistocles undertook the mission and set out first, alone; he instructed the remaining delegates to leave the city when it seemed that the wall was high enough; in the meantime all, slaves and freemen alike, should work on the construction, nor were they to spare any place, be it sacred or private or public, and they should gather up material that they saw fit for fortification everywhere they found it. As a consequence, Athens’ walls were composed in part of shrines and tombs.

Having arrived in Sparta Themistocles refused, however, to go to the magistrates, and he took pains to delay as long as possible under the pretext that he was waiting for his colleagues. While the Spartans complained that the fortification was none the less continuing and he was trying to trick them, in the meantime the rest of the envoys arrived. After they had told him that the ramparts were nearly completed, he went to the Spartan ephors, who wielded supreme power there, and he contended in their presence that they had received false reports: therefore, in all fairness they should send suitable, eminent men whom they trusted to investigate the matter; meanwhile they would retain him as hostage. They complied with his request and sent to Athens three delegates who had held the most important offices. Themistocles ordered his colleagues to set out with the Spartan delegates and not to let them return before his own release. When he supposed that they had arrived in Athens, he went before the Spartan magistracy and senate and acknowledged quite openly to them that the Athenians, acting on his advice and by virtue of international common law, had enclosed within walls the gods of their state and those of their fathers and homes so that they could protect them more readily from the enemy; nor was their action without benefit for Greece, inasmuch as their city, near which the Persian king’s forces had already been brought to ruin twice, served as a bulwark against the foreigners. The Spartans, on the other hand, acted unpatriotically and unjustly in attending to what was beneficial for their own domination rather than for all of Greece. Therefore, if they wanted to recover the delegates whom they had sent to Athens, they should release him, for otherwise they would never welcome them back to their homeland.

He did not, however, escape the ill-will of his compatriots. Due to the same fear by reason of which Miltiades had been condemned, he was banished from the city through balloting with potsherds, and he departed to take up residence in Argos. While he was living there, where he earned much honor through his many fine qualities, the Spartans sent to Athens representatives who accused him in his absence of having formed an alliance with the Persian king to subdue Greece. In pursuance of the charge, the Athenians found him, in absentia, guilty of treason. Hearing this, he realized that he was not safe enough in Argos, and he went to live in Corcyra. When he noticed that the leading citizens there feared that the Spartans and Athenians would provoke a war with them on account of him, he sought refuge with Admetus, king of Molossia, with whom he was associated through ties of hospitality. When he arrived there in Admetus’ absence, so as to see to it that he was received under more binding circumstances, he snatched up the king’s little daughter and hastened with her to a shrine honored with the utmost reverence. He did not leave it until the king, giving him his right hand, swore to protect him. He

13 Probably between 474 and 471.
14 Hospitium, formal ties of hospitality, a sort of ritual friendship or alliance with an obligation of protection between persons of different cities or states; Greek xenia. Admetus’ sacred oath at 8.4 appears to be a reaffirmation of that obligation. Some manuscripts give fuerat = ‘had been’ instead of erat = ‘was’ in this sentence, in which case Admetus’ oath at 8.4 would renew a lapsed relationship. Further, non erat has been proposed as a correction. On the violation of hospitality, see Timotheus 4.3 and Hannibal 12.3.
kept his word. 5 When the Athenians and Spartans officially demanded that the king surrender him, he did not hand over his suppliant but advised him to look after himself: he would indeed find it difficult to remain safe in a place so close to his enemies. Consequently, he had him escorted to Pydna, and he furnished him with sufficient protection. 6 Themistocles boarded a ship there without any of the sailors recognizing him. While a violent storm was driving the vessel towards Naxus, where an Athenian army was stationed then, he knew that if he landed there, it would mean his undoing. The urgency of the situation forced him to reveal who he was to the ship’s captain, and he promised him much if he saved him. 7 The captain, overcome by pity for this most illustrious man, kept his ship at anchor for one day and one night at sea far from the island, and he allowed no one to leave it. From there he landed at Ephesus, where he disembarked Themistocles, who subsequently showed him gratitude for his services.

9 I am aware that many have written that Themistocles crossed over into Asia during Xerxes’ reign. But I have trust especially in Thucydides, since he lived the closest in time among those who have recorded the history of that distant period, and he was from the same city as Themistocles. He asserts, however, that he went to Artaxerxes I and sent him a letter stating the following: 2 “I, Themistocles, have come to you, I who of all the Greeks occasioned the most harm to your family as long as it was necessary for me to wage war with your father and defend my native country. 3 But I also did him much more good as soon as I was free from danger and he began to be in peril. For when after the battle near Salamis he wanted to return to Asia, I informed him by letter that the bridge which he had built over the Dardanelles risked being broken up and that his enemies would surround him: thanks to this information he was saved from danger. 4 Today, however, I, pursued by all of Greece, have fled to you, and I seek your friendship. Should I obtain it, you will have in me no less a good friend than your father found me a courageous foe. And now I ask that you grant me a year’s time to prepare matters for discussion with you and that you permit me to come to you thereafter.”

10 The king, who admired his magnanimity and desired to win over such a distinguished man, granted him permission to do so. During all that year Themistocles applied himself to studying the Persians’ writings and language. He became so accomplished therein that he is said to have spoken in the king’s presence much more eloquently than native Persians could. 2 Having promised the king many things—and the one most pleasing to the king was that he would subdue Greece by force of arms if he chose to make use of his advice—he returned to Asia Minor with the splendid gifts that Artaxerxes had given him, and he settled in Magnesia on the Maeander. 3 For the king, saying that this city would supply him with bread (its region provided a yearly revenue of fifty talents), had granted it to him, and Lampsacus, too, whence he would get his wine, and Myus for his victuals.

Two monuments remain to perpetuate his memory: the tomb in which he was interred near the city and a statue in Magnesia’s forum. 4 There are numerous varying accounts of his demise in the writings of many authors, but again we commend especially the historian Thucydides, who affirms that he died of illness in Magnesia but does not deny the existence of a rumor that he had poisoned himself because he lost hope in his ability to fulfill his promise to the king regarding the conquest of Greece. 5 Moreover, he reports that friends buried his bones in Attica secretly, inasmuch as law forbade it owing to his condemnation for treason.
III. ARISTIDES

1 Aristides, an Athenian, son of Lysimachus, was almost the same age as Themistocles, and so he contended with him for leadership: they in fact disparaged each other. 2 And in these two men one recognizes just how much eloquence outdoes probity. Although Aristides indeed excelled to such an extent with regard to unselfishness that he alone in written history (or at any rate so far as we know) is designated by the agname ‘The Just,’ still he was undone at the instigation of Themistocles: he was banished for ten years through voting by means of potsherds. 3 When he realized that in any event the stirred-up rabble could not be curbed, while departing he observed a certain man voting for his expulsion from his native city; it is said that he asked him why he was doing so and what Aristides had done to be considered deserving of such severe hardship. 4 The man answered him that he did not know Aristides personally, but it displeased him that he had striven so eagerly to be called, above and beyond all others, ‘The Just.’ 5 He did not endure to the end the prescribed penalty of ten years. For when Xerxes I invaded Greece, in about the sixth year of his banishment, a decree of the people reinstated him in his homeland.

2 He participated, however, in the naval battle near Salamis, which took place before the annulment of his punishment. Also, he served as the Athenians’ commander at the battle of Plataea, in which the satrap Mardonius was brought down and the Persian army, destroyed. 2 With respect to military matters, nothing else that he did is as illustrious as the record of his command then. Notwithstanding, one finds many instances of his justice, impartiality, and integrity, among the foremost of which is what occurred when he was in the joint Greek fleet along with Pausanias, the Spartan general who had put Mardonius to flight: due to Aristides’ fairness, supremacy at sea changed hands from the Spartans to the Athenians. 3 In fact before this time the Spartans predominated both on land and at sea. But then, on account of Pausanias’ lack of self-restraint and, also, Aristides’ justice, it happened that nearly all the Greek cities allied themselves with the Athenians and chose them as their leaders against the foreigners.

3 Aristides was selected to determine the amount of money each city would contribute for constructing fleets and putting together armies to drive back the Persians more easily if, perchance, they attempted to launch another war, and in keeping with his decision four hundred sixty talents were conveyed yearly to Delus, where the league decided to found its treasury. At a later time all the funds were transferred to Athens. There exists no surer indication of his disinterestedness than this: even though he had managed such important affairs, he had so few resources when he died that he left barely enough to pay for his burial. 3 As a result his daughters were maintained at public expense, and the league’s treasury provided their dowries when they married. Aristides died about three years after Themistocles’ banishment from Athens.

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15 Their dates of birth are uncertain.
16 Ca. 484.
17 The last word, poena, usually refers to punishment. See, also, 1.5 and 2.1 below. In Athens ostracism was, at least in principle, not a punishment but a means for the populace to remove for a time a citizen considered too powerful, hence dangerous.
18 479. See Pausanias 1.2-2.1.
19 454.
IV. PAUSANIAS

1 Pausanias the Spartan attained to greatness, but inconstancy prevailed in every aspect of his life: just as he shone bright with virtues, so, too, he was overclouded by vices. 2 The battle at Plataea is his most famous. Now, with him in command a rather small Greek force put to flight the royal satrap Mardonius, a Mede, the king’s brother-in-law, among the most distinguished of all the Persians both by reason of his courage in war and ample ingenuity, along with two hundred thousand infantrymen whom he had selected in particular and twenty thousand cavalrymen, and the general himself fell in that battle. 3 Elated because of this victory, the Spartan began to hatch a good many schemes and aspire to bigger things. But he was criticized first when from the booty taken there he placed a golden tripod at Delphi with an epigram to the effect that the barbarians had been crushed at Plataea due to his leadership, and on account of this victory he dedicated the offering to Apollo. 4 The Spartans carved out these verses and inscribed only the names of the cities that had aided in the Persians’ defeat.

2 After the battle Pausanias was sent with the joint fleet to Cyprus and the Dardanelles to drive the Persian garrisons from the regions. 2 As he enjoyed similar good fortune in this campaign, he started to behave even more haughtily and aim at higher things. For instance, when he conquered Byzantium, he seized a good number of Persian nobles, and among them were some of the king’s relatives; making it seem as if they had escaped from imprisonment, he in fact sent them back to Xerxes in secret, and along with them Gongylus of Eretria delivered a letter to the king in which Thucydides reports that the following was written: 3 “Pausanias, the Spartan commander, after having captured these men in Byzantium, found out that they are your relatives, and he sends them to you as a favor and desires to become your kinsman through marriage: therefore he asks you to give him your daughter in matrimony, if you think it fitting. 4 Should you do so, he promises that with your help he will bring both Sparta and the rest of Greece under your control. If you wish anything to be carried out concerning these matters, see to it that you send him a trusted man with whom he may confer.” 5 The king, very much delighted that so many of his closest kinsmen were safe, straightway sent Artabazus to Pausanias with a letter in which he praised him highly and entreated him to make every effort in order to bring about what he promised; if he accomplished it, nothing would be denied him. 6 Thus made aware of the king’s resolution, Pausanias became too eager in conducting the affair, and he incurred the Spartans’ suspicion, whereupon they recalled him. They charged him with a capital crime but acquitted him; still, they fined him. Consequently, he was not sent back to command the fleet.

3 But not long afterwards he returned to the army on his own initiative, and there he brought to light his plans imprudently, in a reckless manner. He changed for the worse not only ancestral customs but the traditional lifestyle and apparel, too. 2 He adopted regal pomp and Median attire; Median and Egyptian attendants escorted him; he dined in the Persian fashion more extravagantly than the company was able to stomach; 3 he did not receive people who sought to meet with him, he replied arrogantly, he commanded cruelly. He refused to return to Sparta; he went to Colonae in the Trojan region, where he formed plans harmful to his native city and himself as well. 4 When they learned this, the Spartans sent him envoys with a staff, or scytale, on which, according to their usage, a message was written: it said that if he did not return home, they would condemn him to death. 5 Troubled by their order, he returned home hoping
that he could avert impending peril even then through money and influence. When he arrived there, the ephors threw him into the public prison: their laws in fact permit any ephor to do so to a ruler.\(^{21}\) Nevertheless, he secured his release, but he was not any less free from suspicion on that account: for the general belief that he was allied with the Persian king persisted. \(^{6}\) There is a certain class of men called helots, a large number of whom cultivate the Spartans’ fields and serve as slaves. The Spartans believed, too, that he was inciting them to revolt in the hope of winning their freedom. \(^{7}\) But in the absence of a manifest crime with which to charge him regarding these matters, they did not think it proper to try such a noble and renowned man on the basis of suspicions, and they decided to wait until the truth revealed itself.

\(^4\) Meanwhile, a certain young man from Argilus, whom Pausanias had loved in a sexual manner when the former was a lad, received a letter from him for Artabazus, and he suspected that something written in it concerned himself, because none of the men sent on a similar mission to that same place ever returned; he undid the letter’s cord, and having removed the seal, he realized that had he carried through in transmitting the letter, he would have been put to death. \(^2\) It also contained business pertaining to what the king and Pausanias had agreed on. He handed the letter over to the ephors. \(^3\) We should not fail to note the Spartans’ cool reason here. For not even this evidence persuaded them to arrest Pausanias, nor did they think that force should be employed before he betrayed himself. Accordingly, they instructed the informer as to what they wanted him to do. \(^4\) At Taenarum there is a temple of Neptune that the Greeks consider sacrosanct. The informer took refuge there and seated himself on the altar. Close to it they had an underground recess made from which someone could be heard clearly were he to speak with the Argilian. Some of the ephors climbed down into it. \(^5\) As soon as Pausanias heard that the Argilian had sought refuge at the altar, alarmed he went there. When he saw him seated on the altar supplicating the god, he asked him the reason for such an unexpected measure. The young man told him what he had ascertained from the letter. \(^6\) Becoming even more alarmed, Pausanias undertook to implore him not to denounce or betray a man who had treated him so very well: because if he granted him a favor and helped him now that he was implicated in such grave matters, it would be worth a great reward for him.

\(^5\) After having learned this, the ephors thought it preferable to arrest him in the city. They set out for it, and Pausanias, having placated the Argilian—or so he imagined—was returning to Sparta when en route, only moments before he was to be arrested, the meaning look of a certain ephor who wanted to alert him made him realize that a trap awaited him. \(^2\) Thus, a few paces ahead of his pursuers, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva called Chalcioicos, or the Brass Sanctuary. To keep him from exiting, the ephors blocked the temple’s doors at once, and they demolished the roof so that he would perish more quickly exposed under the open sky. \(^3\) It is said that Pausanias’ mother was living at the time, and even though quite old then, as soon as she heard of her son’s crime she was among the first to carry a stone to the temple’s entrance in order to immure him. \(^4\) Thus Pausanias stained his great military glory through his ignoble end. He expired immediately after he had been carried moribund from the temple. \(^5\) Although some maintained that they should inter the corpse in the same place as those handed over for execution, the majority disagreed, and they buried him in a spot at a distance from where he had died. Some time later, in accordance with a response of the Delphic oracle, he was exhumed from there and was buried in the same spot where he had breathed his last.

\(^{21}\) Regi = ‘to a king.’ This Pausanias was regent. See another Pausanias, king of Sparta, at Thrasybulus 3.1.
V. CIMON

1 Cimon, an Athenian, son of Miltiades, endured a most difficult early youth. Since his father had been unable to pay the damages assessed by the people and, so, had died in prison, Cimon was held in custody in his place, and Athenian laws did not permit his release unless he paid his father’s fine. 2 Moreover, induced by love as much as custom, he was married to his own sister named Elpinice: in fact it is lawful for an Athenian to marry his paternal half-sister. 3 Desirous of marrying her himself, a certain Callias, who, less noble-born than wealthy, had made a fortune from the mines, pleaded with Cimon to give her to him in wedlock: if he did this, Callias would pay his fine. 4 Although Cimon rejected his proposition, Elpinice refused to allow Miltiades’ son to die in prison inasmuch as she could prevent it, and she agreed to marry Callias if he fulfilled his promise.

2 After having secured his release from custody in that manner, Cimon quickly attained to preeminence. Indeed, he was eloquent enough and most generous, and he possessed extensive practical knowledge of both civil law and military matters, since from his boyhood he had frequented the armies with his father. Consequently he held sway over Athens’ populace, and, also, he exercised particularly great authority among the soldiers. The first time that he served as commander, he put to flight a large army of Thracians near the Strymon River, and he founded the town of Amphipolis and sent ten thousand Athenians there to colonize it. The second time, he captured two hundred Cypriote and Phoenician ships of the fleet defeated near Cape Mycale, and he enjoyed equally good fortune on land the same day. 3 For after he had seized the enemies’ vessels, he immediately landed his troops and vanquished a very large barbarian force in a single encounter. He headed for home in possession of much booty owing to this victory. Seeing that some of the Greek islands had defected by then on account of the harshness of Athens’ ascendency, he strengthened the bonds with those well-disposed towards Athens, and the hostile he compelled to return to their duty. 5 He depopulated Scyrus because the Dolopians who inhabited it then had behaved too defiantly; he expelled these long-standing residents from the city and island and distributed the farm land among Athenian citizens. By the very fact of his arrival he humbled the inhabitants of Thasus, who put their trust in their wealth. The south side of Athens’ citadel was fitted out defensively by means of money derived from the sale of booty.

3 Having become the most prominent man in the city due to those exploits, he met with the same unpopularity as his father and the other leaders among the Athenians: he was banished for ten years through the balloting with potsherds that they call ὀστρακισμός. 2 The Athenians regretted this act more quickly than he: for while he bore courageously the ill-will of his ungrateful fellow citizens, the Spartans declared war on the Athenians, who felt immediately the want of his recognized valor. 3 Therefore, four years after his expulsion, he was recalled to his native city. Since he enjoyed ties of hospitality with the Lacedaemonians and he judged it better to come to an agreement than fight, he set out on his own account for Sparta and brought about peace between the two very powerful states. 4 Shortly afterwards, having been sent as

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22 A reference to two battles near the Eurymedon River (and not Mycale) in 467 or 466.
23 469.
24 463.
25 461.
26 451. Here hospitium, formal ties of hospitality, refers to proxenia, official ties between a Greek state and a foreign guest or ‘friend,’ a sort of consul responsible for receiving citizens of that state in his own.
commander of two hundred ships to Cyprus, the greater part of which island he conquered, he fell ill and died in the fortified town of Citium.

4 The Athenians felt his loss for a long time not only in war but in peace, too. For instance, he owned farms and gardens in a good many places, and he was so generous that he never had them guarded for the sake of protecting what they produced: therefore anyone who wished could, without hindrance, share in their use and enjoyment. 2 Attendants always followed him with cash so that if anyone required his aid, he had something to offer on the spot, lest he seem to refuse by delaying. Often when he saw someone down on his luck and poorly clad, he gave him his mantle. 3 Daily his dinner was prepared for him so that he might summon to his table all those without invitations elsewhere whom he saw in the forum, something he never neglected to do every day. He was never found wanting with respect to his word, his assistance, or his fortune; he made many persons rich; he had buried at his own expense a goodly number who died poor, leaving nothing for their interment. 4 Thus, it comes as no surprise, in view of his behavior, that his life was free from care and his passing, grievous to many.
VI. LYSANDER

1 The Spartan Lysander left to posterity an impressive reputation that resulted more from good fortune than valor. Unquestionably, he finished off the Athenians, who waged war with the Peloponnesians for twenty-six years. 2 The means by which he achieved it is not at all unknown: it occurred not due to his army’s valor but through his adversaries’ insubordination, since they disobeyed their commanders’ orders and were wandering here and there in the region after having abandoned the ships when they fell into their foes’ hands. Consequently, the Athenians surrendered to the Spartans. 3 Although even before he had always been factious and rash, on account of this victory he became so arrogant and took such liberties that because of him the Greeks came to hate the Spartans exceedingly. 4 Whereas the Spartans had repeatedly alleged that they were waging war in order to end the Athenians’ abusive ascendancy, once he took possession of the enemy’s fleet by the Aegos River, he worked hard for no other end than to hold all the city-states in his power, while he pretended to be doing so for the Spartans’ sake. 5 For in fact, having driven out the partisans of the Athenians everywhere, he appointed ten men in each city whom he invested with supreme command and control over all affairs. They included only men who were associated with him through bonds of hospitality or who had sworn faithfully to serve his interests.

2 Thus, after the establishment of the rule of the ten-man boards in all the cities, everything was conducted in conformity with his will. For example’s sake it suffices to mention a single case of his cruelty and treachery so as not to tire our readers by enumerating too many about the same man. 2 While returning victorious from Asia, he stopped off at Thasus because that state had been especially faithful to the Athenians (just as if the most resolute enemies are not wont to become the firmest friends!), and he ardently desired to destroy it. 3 He knew, however, that unless he concealed his intention, the Thasians would scatter and guard their possessions….

3 Therefore, the Spartans removed from power the ten-man boards that he had set up. Burning with resentment because of this, he formed plans to do away with Sparta’s royalty. But he realized that he could not do it without the gods’ help, for the Spartans were accustomed to consult the oracles in all matters. 2 First, he tried to bribe the Delphic oracle. Since he was unable to do so, he tried the oracle at Dodona. Rebuffed there, too, he alleged that he had undertaken solemn vows that he would fulfill at the shrine of Jupiter Ammon in Libya, as he thought to bribe the Africans more easily. 3 He proceeded to Africa with this hope in mind, but the high priests of Jupiter proved to be less than helpful: not only was he unable to bribe them, but they even sent envoys to Sparta who accused him of attempting to corrupt the shrine’s priests. 4 After his arraignment on this charge and the judges’ verdict of acquittal, he was sent to aid the Orchomenians in Boeotia, and he was slain by the Thebans near Haliartus. 5 An oration found in his house after his death gave proof of how justly he had been accused. In it he urges the Spartans to abolish the royalty and choose from among all of them their leader for waging war; but it was composed so as to seem that it conformed to the gods’ will, which he, trusting in the power of money, felt sure to obtain. Cleon of Halicarnassus is said to have written it for him.

4 But here I ought not to pass over in silence something the royal satrap Pharmabazus did. Now, inasmuch as Lysander had committed many cruel and covetous acts while commanding the

28 See Cimon 2.5.
29 There is a lacuna in the manuscripts. In 405 Lysander, by treachery, massacred the Athenian partisans in Thasos.
fleet and he suspected that his compatriots had heard reports of them, he entreated Pharnabazus to furnish him with a testimonial for the ephors that indicated with how much integrity he had conducted the war and treated allies, and he asked him to write about this matter in detail: his authority would carry much weight therein. 2 The satrap courteously promised to do it for him. He drafted a voluminous letter with many statements praising him most highly. After Lysander had read and approved the letter and while it was being sealed, the satrap had substituted for it a second sealed roll of the same size, one so similar as to be indistinguishable from the other, and in it he accused him in fine detail of greed and treachery. 3 Upon Lysander’s return to Sparta, he related to the chief magistrates what he wished about his exploits, and he handed over as evidence the second roll that Pharnabazus had given him. After the ephors had dismissed Lysander and perused the document, they gave it to him to read. Thus this man unwittingly was his own accuser.
VII. ALCIABIADES

1 Alcibiades, an Athenian, son of Clinias. In him Nature seems to have tested her creative ability. All who have handed down reports about him agree in considering him unsurpassed as regards either virtues or vices. 2 Descended from very noble stock in a most illustrious city, in physical beauty he surpassed by far all those of his age; suited to every charge, he had abundant practical ability, for he was in fact a consummate commander both on land and at sea; articulate, he prevailed among the very best in public speaking, since the considerable talent of his expression and style made it impossible for anyone to stand his ground against him; 3 he was wealthy, and when the occasion required, industrious and unyielding; genteel, no less magnificent in his public conduct than in his private lifestyle; affable, charming, conforming to circumstances very skillfully. 4 As soon as he relaxed and no pressing task occupied his mind, this same man was found to be extravagant, negligent, licentious, and lacking in self-restraint, so that all marveled at the presence of so much inconsistency and such a self-contradictory nature in a single human being.

2 He was brought up in Pericles’ household (some say that he was his stepson), and Socrates instructed him. His father-in-law Hipponicus was the richest of all the Greek-speakers. If he himself had cared to think about it, he could not have imagined more boons or obtained more remarkable ones than those that either Nature or Fortune had bestowed upon him. 2 In his early youth he was loved, in the Greek fashion, by many men, among them Socrates, as Plato notes in ‘The Symposium.’ He represented him there recalling that he had spent a night with Socrates and had risen in the morning from his couch not otherwise than a son ought to rise from his father’s. 3 In adulthood he loved no fewer than these, in which affairs he did very many charming and playful things, as far as it was permissible in such distasteful business: we would relate them did we not consider matters of greater significance preferable here.

3 During the Peloponnesian War the Athenians, owing to his advice and influence, declared war on the Syracusans: they chose him to lead it and appointed, moreover, two colleagues, Nicias and Lamachus. 2 During preparations for the campaign, before the fleet’s departure it occurred in a single night that all the pillars of Hermes in Athens were thrown down except for the one standing before Andocides’ house door (as a result, afterwards it was usually called Andocides’ Mercury). 3 Since clearly it could not have come about without numerous men united in an extensive conspiracy concerning the state rather than a private matter, the common people became very frightened lest some force arise suddenly in the city to quash their freedom. 4 This seemed best to fit Alcibiades’ public person because he was deemed more influential and important, too, than an ordinary citizen: he had indeed won over many through his generosity, and he had gained even more supporters through his services as an advocate. 5 Consequently, it happened that as often as he appeared in public, all turned their gaze towards him, nor was anyone considered his equal in the state. Therefore, not only did they place the greatest hope in him, but they also feared him greatly, because he could do both very much good and harm. 6 Furthermore, he was tainted by scandal, since rumor reported that he performed the secret rites in his own home (a sacrilege according to Athenian custom), and it was thought to pertain not to religious scruple but conspiracy.

4 In the public assembly his enemies accused him of that crime. But the time was at hand

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30 415.
to set out for the war. Considering this and, also, knowing full well the habits of his countrymen, he asked for the inquiry to take place with him present if they meant to take some action against him rather than for him to be charged, due to ill-will, with a crime in his absence. 2 However, since his enemies recognized that he could not be harmed then, they decided to remain silent for the time being and wait for him to depart so as to attack him while absent, and they acted accordingly. 3 As soon as they supposed that he had arrived in Sicily, they charged him in his absence with violation of the sacred rites. In consequence the magistracy sent him an order to return home from Sicily to plead his case, and even though he had high hopes of accomplishing his military mission, he did not want to disobey, and he boarded the vessel that had been sent to take him back. 4 After it had carried him to Thurii in Italy, he reflected a good deal upon his fellow citizens’ excessive lawlessness and cruelty towards eminent men, and he judged it most expedient to avoid the impending tempest: he slipped away from his guards and went from there first to Elis and, next, to Thebes. 5 But when he heard that the Athenians had condemned him on a capital charge and confiscated his property and, as had happened before in other instances, had made the Eumolpidae priests execrate him, and in order to commemorate the curse, had put in a public place a copy of it engraved on a stone pillar, he moved to Sparta. 6 There, as he was wont to boast, he carried on war not against his native city but his own enemies who themselves were foes of that city: for although they recognized that he could do very much good for the state, they had ousted him from Athens and had yielded more to their own resentment than to the common good. 7 And so, on his advice the Spartans formed an alliance with the Persian king, then they fortified Decelea in Attica, and by posting a permanent garrison there, they placed Athens in great peril. Due to his efforts they turned Ionia away from alliance with the Athenians, after which they started to have the upper hand in the war.

5 But in fact these services produced not so many friends for Alcibiades as adversaries owing to fear of him: when they came to know this most keen man’s outstanding competence in all domains, they feared very much that induced by love of his native land, he might one day break with them and resume friendly relations with his compatriots. And so, they decided to seek an opportunity to slay him. 2 It was impossible to hide it for long from Alcibiades: he was so shrewd that he could not be duped, especially when he directed his attention to guarding against danger. Consequently, he had recourse to Tissaphernes, King Darius II’s prefect, 3 with whom he established an intimate friendship. Seeing that the Athenians’ military might was waning because of their setbacks in Sicily, while on the contrary Sparta’s power was on the rise, he began by communicating through intermediaries with the Athenian commander Pisander, who had an army at Samus, and he proposed returning to Athens. A supporter of the aristocrats and an opponent of the people’s power, he, then, shared Alcibiades’ political views. 4 After Pisander had turned his back on him, Alcibiades was first welcomed by the army thanks to Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, and was made commander at Samus; next, with Theramenes’ support, he was reinstated by the people’s vote, and he was appointed, in his absence, to share command equally with Thrasybulus and Theramenes. 5 With them in charge the situation changed so dramatically that the Spartans, who shortly before had enjoyed victory upon victory, became quite frightened and sued for peace. For they had suffered defeat in five land battles and three at sea, wherein they had lost two hundred triremes to the enemy. 6 Along with his colleagues Alcibiades had retaken Ionia, the Dardanelles, and, moreover, many Greek cities on the Asian coast, several of which, including

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31 412.
Byzantium, they had conquered by force of arms, nor had they won over as allies any fewer than these owing to their prudence, since they had acted clemently towards their captives. So, their ships laden with booty and the army made rich, after those momentous exploits the commanders returned to Athens.  

When the whole city went down to the Piraeus to greet them, all desired so much to catch sight of Alcibiades that the common people came together in crowds at his trireme, just as if he alone had arrived. They were in fact convinced that their past adversities and recent successes as well had occurred because of him, and thus they blamed themselves both for the loss of Sicily and Sparta’s victories, since they had banished such a worthy man from their city. And they did not seem to think this without good reason, for after he had begun to command the army, neither on land nor at sea had their enemies been able to match them. When he disembarked, although Theramenes and Thrasybulus had been in charge of the same operations and arrived in the Piraeus at the same time as he, nevertheless, everyone escorted only him, and—something that had never occurred before except in the case of victors at the Olympic games—the populace bestowed on him gilded and bronze crowns. Weeping he accepted these tokens of his compatriots’ goodwill while he called to mind the harshness of former times. When he entered the city, a public assembly was convened; he addressed it in such a fashion that no one was so hardhearted that he did not shed tears over Alcibiades’ misfortune and declare himself the enemy of those responsible for banishing him from his homeland, exactly as if some other people, and not those weeping then, had condemned him for sacrilege! Consequently, his possessions were restored to him at public expense, and the same Eumolpidae priests who had execrated him were obliged to backtrack in freeing him from the curse, and those pillars on which the spell had been inscribed were cast into the sea.

Alcibiades’ happiness was short-lived. When the Athenians had conferred by decree every honor on him and had handed over the administration of the whole government in peacetime and in war to the control of a single man; and when they granted his request to appoint as his two colleagues Thrasybulus and Adimantus, and he departed for Asia with the fleet, he became unpopular once more for having conducted operations at Cyme less than satisfactorily: they indeed thought that he could not fail at anything. As a result, they blamed him for all unsuccessful enterprises, since, they said, he had carried them out either negligently or in bad faith, just as it happened then: for they charged that he had been unwilling to capture Cyme because the Persian king had bribed him. For this reason we deem that their overestimation of his talent and valor harmed him immensely: the fact is that they loved him no more than they feared him lest, carried away by his good fortune and great authority, he covet tyrannical power. Due to these circumstances they rescinded his military command in his absence and replaced him with another. When he found out, he did not wish to return home, and he went to Pactye and strengthened three redoubts in the region, at Orni, Bizanthe, and Neontichos; with a small armed force that he had gathered, he was the first from a Greek city-state to enter into Thrace, as he considered it more glorious to enrich himself through foreign booty than that of the Greeks. As a consequence both his fame and wealth increased, and he acquired for himself solid alliances with certain Thracian kings.

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32 407.
33 At 4.5 above, there was a single pillar.
34 Greeks had gone into Thrace on earlier occasions, as Cornelius Nepos was doubtless aware. He perhaps meant here to indicate the extent of penetration into the region’s interior. See 9.1 infra.
8 But, still, he could not free himself from love for his native city. When Philocles, the Athenian commander, had stationed his fleet near the Aegos River, not far from the Spartan general Lysander, who was engaged in dragging out the war as long as possible, since the Persian king was supplying his men with funds, while on the other hand the spent Athenians had nothing left but their weapons and vessels, 2 Alcibiades went to the Athenians’ army and set about proposing what follows in the presence of the soldiers thronged there: he vowed that if they wished, he would force Lysander to fight or seek peace; the Spartans did not want to fight using their fleet because their land troops were stronger than their navy; 3 but it would be easy for him to get the Thracian king Seuthes to force Lysander from his position on land: therefore, he would either have to fight with his fleet or conclude peace. 4 Even though Philocles saw that what he said was true, he did not, however, want to do what he asked, since he realized that if Alcibiades were welcomed back, he himself would lose all influence over the army; and should something favorable result, he would receive no credit, but conversely, if some adversity occurred, he alone would take the blame for the failure. 5 While departing Alcibiades said to him: “Seeing that you are opposed to our native country’s victory, I give you this further advice: do not maintain your naval camp close to the enemy. There is indeed the risk that your soldiers’ unruliness will provide the occasion for Lysander to take your army by surprise.” 6 He was not mistaken about this. For when Lysander learned through his scouts that the Athenian rank and file had left the vessels nearly empty in order to seek plunder on land, he did not pass up the opportunity to act, and his attack put an end to the whole war.

9 But Alcibiades, believing that with the defeat of the Athenians he was vulnerable in this same coastal region, withdrew far into the interior of Thrace beyond the Sea of Marmara in the hope that his wealth could be concealed most readily there. 2 He was mistaken. Now, when the Thracians learned that he had come with a good deal of money, they laid a trap for him: they stole what he had carried there, but they were unable to capture him. 3 Recognizing that no place in Greece was safe for him on account of the Spartans’ might, he crossed over to Pharnabazus in Asia, whom he captivated through his refinement to such an extent that he became the satrap’s closest friend. Pharnabasus in fact gave him Grynium, a fortress in Phrygia, from which he received fifty talents in revenue a year. 4 He was not content with his good fortune, and he could not bear for defeated Athens to bow before the Spartans. Therefore he directed his whole attention to freeing his native city. 5 But he realized that it could not be done without the aid of the Persian king, and for this reason he desired to gain his friendship, nor did he doubt that he could obtain it easily if only he had the chance to meet with him. As a matter of fact, he knew that Cyrus, the king’s brother, was secretly preparing to wage war on him with the Spartans’ assistance. 37 He supposed that if he revealed it to the king, he would enter into his good graces.

10 While he was working on this plan and was entreat ing Pharnabazus to send him to the king, at the same time Critias and the other tyrants ruling the Athenians had sent trusted men to Lysander in Asia to inform him that unless he did away with Alcibiades, none of the arrangements that he had made in Athens would stand: therefore, if he wanted what he had transacted to hold good, he should hunt him down. 2 Made anxious on that account, the Spartan

35 That is, by not carrying out Alcibiades’ plan.
36 Here fortuna may mean ‘goods,’ ‘lot,’ or ‘misfortune.’ Cf. 9.4, where it is ‘good fortune,’ and ‘luck’ at Thrasybulus 1.1. See Hannibal 9.1-10.1 for a comparable situation.
37 See Xenophon’s Anabasis, book one, on the war between Cyrus and Artaxerxes II.
38 See Lysander 1.5 and 3.1; Thrasybulus 2.7-3.1.
decided to put pressure on Pharnabazus. Consequently, he told him that he would annul the king’s alliance with the Spartans if he did not deliver Alcibiades, living or dead, to him. The satrap yielded, and he preferred to act inhumanely rather than permit his king’s power to be weakened. And so he sent Susamithres and Bagaeus to slay Alcibiades while he was in Phrygia preparing to go to the king. They dealt secretly with men living in Alcibiades’ neighborhood then to have them kill him. Since the assassins did not dare to attack him with arms, at night they surrounded with firewood the small dwelling where he slept and kindled it so as to finish off by fire the man they could not count on overcoming by force. The sound of the flames wakened him, however, and as his sword had been stolen from him, he grasped a friend’s dagger. For in his company was a certain Arcadian associated with him through bonds of hospitality, a man ever unwilling to forsake him. Alcibiades directed him to follow, and he snatched up whatever garments he found then; having tossed them on the fire, he traversed the raging flames. When the foreigners saw that he had escaped the fire, they slew him with darts thrown from a distance, and they took his head back to Pharnabazus. But a woman who had lived with him covered his corpse with her feminine attire and cremated it in the building fire set to do away with him while alive. Thus Alcibiades met his end at about forty years of age.

11 Three most estimable historians extol superlatively this man whom very many authors find disreputable: his contemporary Thucydides, Theopompus, born a little later, and Timaeus. The last two—both, indeed, are much given to speaking ill of their subjects—agree somehow or other in praising this individual. They commend him in the matters that I recorded above as well as in what follows: a native of Athens, the most magnificent of cities, he surpassed everyone there in the magnificence and distinction of his way of life; exiled, he went to Thebes, where he devoted himself to the Boeotians’ particular pursuits to such a degree that no one could equal him with respect to labor or bodily strength (as a whole they cultivate physical vigor more than intellectual acumen); among the Spartans, according to whose mores forbearance is considered the supreme virtue, this same man practiced austerity in such a manner that he outdid them all in the frugality of his table and personal comfort; he lived among the Thracians, men given to drinking and lasciviousness: in those pursuits he surpassed them, too; he went to the Persians, for whom bravery in hunting and luxurious living are most praiseworthy: he emulated their practices so well that he astonished even them very greatly therein. Thus he succeeded in winning preeminence and the highest esteem among whatever people he chanced to live. But enough about him: let us now describe the remaining generals.

39 See Theopompus’ negative character evaluation at Iphicrates 3.2.
VIII. THRASYBULUS

1 Thrasybulus, an Athenian, son of Lycus. If valor alone were taken into account, without considering luck, I would tend to place him first before all. About this there is no hesitation: I prefer no one to him with regard to trustworthiness, constancy, greatness of spirit, and patriotism. 2 Indeed, while many have wished, and few have been able, to liberate their native land from a single despot, he had the good fortune to free from servitude his country oppressed by thirty tyrants. 3 But I do not know how it is that although no one outdid him with respect to the virtues just named, many surpassed him in renown. First of all, he achieved much in the Peloponnesian War without Alcibiades, who accomplished nothing without him; yet Alcibiades, through some inborn gift, received credit for everything. 4 But, still, generals share all such successes with their soldiers and Chance, too, since in the rush of battle the operation changes in nature from the general’s plan to the troops and vigor of those fighting. And so, while the soldier lays rightful claim to some part of his general’s glory, Fortune claims, indeed, the largest part of it, and she can rightly boast that she was more effective herein than the general’s competence. 5 Wherefore this most splendid deed goes to Thrasybulus’ credit alone: when the thirty tyrants placed in charge by the Spartans held Athens under their heel in servitude, and they either drove out or slew numerous citizens whom Fortune had spared in the war, and they divided among themselves the possessions confiscated from a great many, 40 he was not merely the first but rather the only one at the beginning to declare war on them.

2 Having sought refuge in Phyle, a soundly fortified hold in Attica, he had no more than thirty of his partisans with him. This was the source of the Athenians’ salvation, this was that most famous city’s fortress of freedom. 2 At first, however, the tyrants looked upon him and his few companions with contempt. That led in effect both to the ruin of those who were contemptuous and the salvation of those whom they looked down on: for it made the former slow to pursue the latter, whom, on the other hand, it made stronger by granting them time to prepare themselves, 3 which is all the more reason why everyone should keep in mind the maxim ‘nothing ought to be slighted in war,’ and people are right to say that the mother of a coward rarely weeps. 4 At any rate, Thrasybulus’ forces did not increase as much as he expected, since even in those distant times patriotic citizens spoke more bravely in favor of freedom than they fought for it. 5 From Phyle he went to the Piraeus and fortified the port of Munychia, which the tyrants twice undertook to attack, and when they were driven back from it in disgrace, straightway they took refuge in the city after having abandoned their weapons and stores. 6 Thrasybulus showed no less good judgment than courage: he forbade his men to harm opponents who surrendered (he believed it just for citizens to spare their fellow citizens), nor was anyone wounded unless he intentionally started a fight. He stripped of his garments no one lying dead; he took nothing except for weapons that he needed and suitable foodstuffs. 7 In the second battle Critias, the tyrants’ leader, fell as, in fact, he was fighting most bravely face to face with Thrasybulus. 41

3 After Critias’ death Pausanias, king of the Spartans, went to assist the Athenians. He brought about peace between Thrasybulus and those in control of the city under these terms: apart from the thirty tyrants and the ten put in charge afterwards, who acted as cruelly as those before, no one would suffer exile or confiscation of his property; the administration of the government

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40 404.
41 403.
would be restored to the people. 2 Here is another of Thrasybulus’ notable deeds: after the return of peace, when his influence in the state was at its zenith, he proposed a law stipulating that no one would be indicted or punished for anything done previously, and they called it the law of amnesty. 3 In truth, not only did he introduce the law, he saw to it that it prevailed as well. For example, when some of his former companions in exile wanted to slaughter compatriots even though they had received official pardon, he forbade it, and he stood by what he had promised.

4 In return for his momentous services, the people presented him with an honorary crown consisting of two olive branches. Since his fellow citizens’ affection—in the absence of any coercion—had produced this token, it occasioned not envy but, rather, great glory. 2 So, when the inhabitants of Mytilene offered several thousand acres of land as a gift to Pittacus, numbered among the Seven Sages, he spoke well in replying: “I beseech you, do not give me all this, since many would be envious and even more would covet it. For that reason, out of what you offer I want no more than seventy acres, which will be a sign of both my moderation and your goodwill.” In truth, small tributes usually endure whereas opulent ones do not. 3 In short, content with that crown, Thrasybulus neither asked for anything more, nor did he think anyone to have been more highly honored than himself. 4 Later on, as admiral he landed the fleet in Cilicia; sentry duties in his camp were not performed diligently enough, and foreigners, having sallied out at night from their fortified town, slew him in his tent.
IX. CONON

1 Conon, an Athenian, began his political career in the Peloponnesian War, during which he played an important part, since he acted as general in charge of the infantry, and he carried out major operations at sea as admiral of the fleet. For these reasons he was vested with a distinguished office: he alone governed all the islands, in which capacity he seized Pherae, a Spartan colony. Moreover, he served as commander in chief at the close of the Peloponnesian War, when Lysander defeated the Athenian forces near the Aegos River. But he was absent then, on account of which the operation was managed quite badly: for he was an attentive commander skilled, furthermore, in military matters. Therefore, no one doubted at the time that such a calamity would not have befallen the Athenians had he been present.

2 But after this misfortune, when he learned that his native city was invested, he did not seek a place where he might live in safety but one from which he could serve to defend his compatriots. Accordingly, he went to Pharnabazus, the satrap of Ionia and Lydia, who was also the Persian king’s son-in-law and kinsman: through a good deal of effort and after having faced many perils, he won much favor in his eyes. Now, when after the Athenians’ defeat the Spartans put an end to the alliance that they had made with Artaxerxes II, they sent Agesilaus to Asia to wage war, and they did so particularly at the instigation of Tissaphernes, one of the king’s intimates who had betrayed his friendship and had entered into an agreement with the Spartans. Pharnabazus was regarded as the royal general opposed to him, but in reality Conon assumed command of the army, and all matters were conducted under his guidance. He hampered the consummate commander Agesilaus greatly, and often he foiled his stratagems, and it was in fact clear that had it not been for him, Agesilaus would have wrested Asia from the king as far as the Taurus Range. When Agesilaus’ fellow citizens called him home because the Boeotians and Athenians had declared war on the Spartans, Conon nevertheless maintained his association with the king’s administrators and was quite useful to all of them.

3 Tissaphernes had deserted the king, yet it was not as apparent to Artaxerxes as to everyone else: even though he no longer remained loyal, the king still valued him on account of the many important services he had performed. Nor was it surprising that he was not easily led to believe him a traitor, as he recalled that through Tissaphernes’ efforts he had vanquished his brother Cyrus. For the purpose of accusing him Pharnabazus sent Conon to the king. After his arrival, following the Persian custom he first approached Tithraustes, the ‘chiliarchus,’ or chancellor, second in rank in the empire, and he made known his desire to speak with the king. Indeed, no one is admitted without doing so. He said to Conon: “Nothing prevents it, but you should consider whether you prefer to speak in person or to communicate your thoughts in writing, because if you come into the king’s presence, you must venerate him” (what the Greeks call προσκύνησις, or adoration). “If you find this objectionable, you can none the less bring about what you desire through me by means of written instructions.” Conon then replied: “In truth, I do not object to honoring the king in any manner whatever, but I fear that it may be a cause of disgrace for the state from which I set out, one accustomed to commanding the other nations, were I to submit to foreigners’ practices rather than maintain its own.” And so, he handed over to him what he proposed in a written document.

4 After having studied it the king was so influenced by his counsel that he proclaimed

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42 405.
43 See Agesilaus 2.1-4.1.
Tissaphernes an enemy, directed Conon to wage a war of vengeance on the Spartans, and permitted him to choose whom he wanted to handle the funds for the campaign. Conon said that it was not for him to decide but for the king himself, who ought to know his own men best; but he recommended that he place the business in Pharnabazus’ hands. 2 Next, after having received valuable gifts, he was sent seaward to requisition battleships from the Cypriote, Phoenician, and other maritime states and to put together a fleet for safeguarding the sea the following summer, with Pharnabazus to assist him, just as he had wished. 3 When this was reported to the Spartans, they managed the matter with care, since they thought that a greater war was imminent than if they contended with the foreign king alone. For they saw that this courageous and experienced leader would preside over the king’s military resources, and he whom they could not outdo with respect either to ability or troops would fight against them. 4 Reasoning thus, they assembled a large fleet and set out with Pisander the Spartan as commander. Attacking them near Cnidus Conon put them to flight in a momentous battle, captured a good number of ships, and sank many others. 44 Due to his victory not only was Athens liberated but all of Greece that had been under Sparta’s rule was, too. 5 Conon returned to his native city with part of the vessels, saw to the rebuilding of the walls demolished by Lysander, both those around the Piraeus and Athens, and bestowed upon his fellow citizens fifty talents in money that he had received from Pharnabazus.

5 It befell him, as with other mortals, that he behaved less cautiously when Fortune favored him than when she was unkind. For after the defeat of the Spartans’ fleet, at which time he thought that he had avenged the wrongs done to his homeland, he aspired to more than he could accomplish. 2 Still, his aims were neither unpatriotic nor blameworthy, in so far as he preferred for his native land’s power to be increased rather than the king’s. Having established his great authority not only among the foreigners but all the Greek cities as well on account of that well-known naval battle fought near Cnidus, he began to work secretly for the restoration of Ionia and Aeolia to the Athenians. 3 Since he did not conceal his intentions carefully enough, Tiribazus, who governed Sardis, summoned him on the pretext that he wanted to send him to the king concerning important business. As soon as he arrived in compliance with Tiribazus’ order, he was thrown into prison, where he remained for a time. 4 Some have written that then he was taken away to the king, and he died there. Dinon, the historian whom we trust the most regarding Persian matters, has written, on the contrary, that he escaped: he calls in question whether this occurred with Tiribazus’ knowledge or not.

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44 394.
X. DION

1 Dion, a Syracusan of noble stock, Hipparinus’ son, had a hand in the governments of both tyrants named Dionysius, father and son. For Dionysius the Elder was the spouse of Aristomache, Dion’s sister, who bore him two sons, Hipparinus and Nisaeus, as well as two daughters named Sophrosyne and Arete; to another son, Dionysius, who inherited his realm, he gave in marriage the first daughter, and the second, Arete, he married to Dion. 2 But in addition to his notable relatives and his ancestors’ excellent reputation, Dion received from Nature many other advantages, including a tractable, courteous disposition suitable to the best character, an impressive physique that made him stand out, along with extensive riches inherited from his father that he himself had increased through the tyrant’s bounty. 3 He was Dionysius the Elder’s intimate no less due to his character than to relationship by marriage. For although he disliked Dionysius’ cruelty, none the less he took pains for him to remain safe because of their personal connections and even more so for the sake of his own family. He assisted in important business, and his advice carried much weight with the despot except when the latter’s stronger passion interfered in some matter. 4 The truth is that Dion directed all the major embassies, and his attentive undertakings and faithful administration of them mitigated, on account of his kindness, the tyrant’s reputation for great cruelty. 5 When Dionysius sent him to the Carthaginians, they looked up to him so much that they never admired any other Greek-speaker more.

2 These points did not, however, escape Dionysius’ notice: he realized how much honor he received thanks to Dion. Thereby he was particularly indulgent towards him alone, and he cherished him just as he would a son: 2 indeed, when word reached Sicily that Plato had arrived at Tarentum, he could not refuse the young man’s request to send for him, since Dion ardently desired to hear him. Consequently he granted his wish and had Plato escorted to Syracuse with much ostentation. 3 Dion admired and loved him to such an extent that he devoted himself wholly to him. Nor truly was Plato himself any less charmed by Dion. And so, even though he had been cruelly outraged by the tyrant, inasmuch as he had ordered him to be sold as a slave, nevertheless, he returned to the very same place later induced by Dion’s prayers. 4 Meanwhile Dionysius fell ill. Since he was seriously afflicted, Dion questioned the doctors about his condition, and he asked them, too, if perchance it worsened, to inform him, for he wished to talk with him about dividing the realm, because he believed that his own sister’s two sons born to the tyrant should have a share in it. 5 The doctors did not keep the conversation secret, and they related it to Dionysius the Younger. Spurred on by this, he made the doctors administer a sleeping potion to his father so that Dion would not have the opportunity to act. Having taken it the patient, unconscious as in sleep, met his end.

3 So commenced the enmity between Dion and Dionysius, and it intensified due to several circumstances. But, still, at first a feigned mutual amity continued for a while. As Dion did not desist from entreating Dionysius to send for Plato in Athens and profit by his counsel, the despot, who wanted to copy his father in some deed, humored him. 2 And at the same time he brought back to Syracuse the historian Philistus, a man no more friendly to this tyrant than to tyrants in general. But more information concerning him is published in the book on Greek historians. 3 On the other hand, Plato’s influence over Dionysius was so great and his eloquence

45 388. Plato’s second voyage to Syracuse took place in 367, after Dionysius the Elder’s death.
46 367.
47 That is, the biographies of Greek historians in his Lives of Distinguished Men.
so powerful that he convinced him to put an end to his tyranny and restore liberty to the Syracusans. But deterred from that purpose owing to Philistus’ advice, he began to behave rather more cruelly.

4 Recognizing indeed that Dion surpassed him with respect to natural ability, influence, and the people’s affection, he feared that if he kept him in his company, he might provide him with some opportunity to subvert him; therefore he presented him with a trireme for removal to Corinth, and he declared that he was doing it for the sake of them both, so that due to their mutual fear, neither would forestall the other. 48 2 Since many were indignant because of this measure and the despot was very unpopular, Dionysius had all of Dion’s movable belongings placed in ships and delivered to him. Thus he wanted people to think that he had acted not out of hatred for the man but for his own safety. 3 After hearing, however, that he was gathering an army in the Peloponnese and was preparing to wage war on him, he married Arete, Dion’s wife, to another, and he ordered his son to be reared so that by indulging him, he would be steeped in the most shameful passions. 4 For example, prostitutes were brought to the lad even before he reached puberty, he was gorged on wine and delicacies, nor was any opportunity permitted for him to remain sober. 5 After his father’s return home, the youth could not bear a change in the life that he had led up till then (in fact guards were appointed to turn him away from his earlier lifestyle); consequently, he threw himself from the housetop, and, so, he died. But I return to Dion.

5 After Dion arrived in Corinth, and Heraclides, formerly a cavalry commander whom the same Dionysius had banished, took refuge there, too, they began to prepare for war by every means. 2 But they made little progress, however, because the long-standing tyranny was deemed to be quite powerful: for that reason they persuaded few to join in the venture. 3 But Dion, relying not so much on his troops as on hatred of the tyrant, set out most courageously with two transport ships to attack a fifty-year-old rule defended by five hundred battleships, ten thousand horse, and one hundred thousand infantrymen, and people everywhere were astonished that he overthrew it with such ease when two days after his arrival in Sicily, he entered Syracuse. 49 From this one can infer that no crown rests secure if not supported by goodwill. 4 Dionysius was not present at the time: he was in Italy awaiting his adversaries’ fleet, as he supposed that no one would confront him without ample armed forces. In that regard he erred, 5 for Dion suppressed the ruler’s arrogance by means of the very men who had been under his opponent’s domination, and he gained possession of all the part of Sicily that had been under Dionysius’ sway and, likewise, the city of Syracuse except the citadel and island adjoining the town, 6 and he pursued the campaign to the extent that the despot agreed to make peace on these terms: Dion would obtain Sicily, Dionysius, Italy, and Syracuse would go to Apollocrates, the one man whom Dionysius trusted the most.

6 A sudden change followed close on the heels of these most favorable and indeed surprising circumstances, inasmuch as due to her characteristic inconstancy Fortune undertook to cast down the person whom she had raised on high shortly before. 2 First, she exercised her power with respect to the son whom I mentioned before. When Dion was reunited with his wife, who had been given to another, and he wanted to call his son back to virtue and away from profligacy, he received the most grievous wound as a father through his son’s death. 3 Then,

48 366.
49 357.
50 Apollocrates was Dionysius’ son. The manuscripts mistakenly give Dion here. At any rate, Dionysius’ soldiers continued for some time to occupy Syracuse’s citadel on the island of Ortygia.
dissension arose between him and Heraclides, who, since he would not yield supremacy to him, organized an opposing faction. Nor did Heraclides have less influence than his rival among the aristocrats, who, with one accord, chose him to head the fleet, while Dion commanded the land forces. 4 Dion did not bear this with equanimity, and he quoted that famous verse from Homer’s second canto51 to the effect that a many-headed state cannot be governed well. His statement provoked great unpopularity, as it seemed to reveal that he wanted power over everything. 5 He strove to quell the discontent through harshness rather than calm it through lenience, and after Heraclides’ arrival in Syracuse, he saw to it that he was slain.

7 The deed inspired terror in everyone: after that man’s murder no one believed himself safe. As for Dion, with his rival out of the way, he distributed among the soldiers without much restraint the possessions of those whose views he knew to be against him. 2 Since subsequent to this distribution ordinary expenses became enormous, money quickly began to run out, nor was there any for him to lay hold of except among his associates’ possessions. As matters stood, having conciliated the soldiers, he lost the nobles’ support. 3 He was racked with care over these problems, and unaccustomed to hearing people speak ill of him, he did not bear calmly for those to judge him badly who a little earlier had praised him to the skies. And while the soldiers’ attitude towards him had become hostile, the populace spoke rather freely and said repeatedly that the tyrant should not be endured.

8 He considered carefully this grumbling but did not know how to still it, and he feared the end to which it was headed. At that time a certain Callicrates,52 an Athenian citizen who had accompanied him from the Peloponnesus to Sicily, a cunning man, an expert in deception, altogether unscrupulous and disloyal, approached Dion and said 2 that he faced grave danger because of the people’s hatred and the soldiers’ hostility, danger that he could elude in no way except by having one of his own men pretend to be his enemy. If he found someone suitable, he would readily learn what everyone was thinking and destroy his adversaries, since his foes would reveal their dissenting views. 3 After Dion had approved his plan, Callicrates received that role to play, and he armed himself owing to Dion’s imprudence. He sought accomplices in order to slay him, met with the despot’s foes, and ensured their loyalty by an oath. 4 Word of the plot involving many confederates leaked out, and it reached Aristomache, Dion’s sister, and his wife Arete, who, thoroughly frightened, met with the man about whose peril they were alarmed. But he denied that Callicrates was plotting against him, and he said that he himself had ordered what was being done. 5 Nevertheless, the women escorted Callicrates to the temple of Proserpina and compelled him to swear that Dion would have nothing to fear from him. He was not simply undeterred by reason of this sacred oath, but he was spurred on to hasten matters, as he feared that his plan would be exposed before he had executed what he had in mind.

9 Such was his intention the following feast day, while Dion, so as to avoid the press, remained at home and was reclining in an upper chamber. Callicrates left the more secure positions in the city in the hands of his accomplices in crime, surrounded the building with guards, and appointed trusted men to remain at the entrance doors; 2 further, he equipped a trireme with armed men, handed it over to his brother Philostratus, and ordered him to maneuver in the port as if he wanted to train the rowers—he did so thinking that if perhaps Fortune thwarted his plans, he would have a way to flee to safety. 3 Then, too, he selected from among his accomplices some young men from the isle of Zacynthus who were both very daring and strong, who were both very daring and strong.

51 Iliad 2.204.
52 According to Plutarch, he was named Callippos.
and he gave them the mission of going to Dion unarmed so that they would appear to arrive for the sake of a friendly meeting with him. Since they were well-known, they gained admission. But once they had crossed Dion’s threshold and bolted the doors, they fell upon him lying on a couch and restrained him: there was such a din that it could be heard outdoors. Herein it was easy for all to recognize, as I have often noted before, how hatred political power is when held in a single man’s hands, and what pitiable lives men lead who prefer to be feared rather than loved. For no doubt those very guards, had they been well-disposed, could have broken the doors open and saved him, since the unarmed men demanding a weapon from those outside were holding him alive. As no one came to his aid, a certain Syracusan named Lyco handed through the windows a sword with which Dion was slain.

10 Subsequent to the assassination, when a crowd had entered for the sake of looking at the scene, some men were cut down as the guilty parties by those ignorant of the circumstances: for word of the violence done to Dion spread quickly, and many who were displeased with such villainy had flocked there; misled by false suppositions, they slew the innocent as if they were wrongdoers. With the news of his death, the populace’s attitude changed in an astonishing manner: the same people who had called him a despot again and again while he lived praised him at this time as the man who had liberated their homeland and driven out the tyrant. Thus compassion unexpectedly replaced hatred inasmuch as they would have been eager to redeem him from Hades, if they could, with their own blood. And so, interred at public expense, he was granted a sepulchral memorial in a much frequented place in the city. He died at about the age of fifty-five, three years after his return from the Peloponnesus to Sicily.

53 We do not know which guards Nepos means: Callicrates’ guards around the residence, the trusted men whom he posted at the entrance, or Dion’s men who admitted the assassins. In any case, according to the following paragraph, at least some Syracusans appear to have been well-disposed to Dion at this time, as they did not hesitate to avenge his death.
XI. IPHICRATES

1 Iphicrates, an Athenian, became famous even more on account of applied military science than the greatness of his exploits. Yet he was so distinguished a general that not only does he rank among the foremost of his contemporaries, but not even someone of an earlier generation might be preferred to him. 2 Indeed, he was frequently engaged in warfare; often he commanded armies; not once did he suffer defeat through his fault; he always prevailed thanks to his ingenuity, and he was so capable in this respect that he introduced much that was new in the art of war, and he improved on what already existed. 3 For instance, he changed the infantry’s equipment for the better. Although before he became commander infantrymen used very large round shields and short spears and swords, he, on the contrary, replaced that shield with a small crescent-shaped one, the ‘pelta’ (thereafter foot-soldiers were called peltasts because of it), so that they would be less weighed down in their movements and charges; he doubled the spear’s length and made the swords longer. He changed their cuirasses, too, by replacing the bronze and mail with linen. Thus he made the soldiers less encumbered: for by removing this weight he saw to it that the equipment protected the body just as well and was light.

2 He carried on war with the Thracians and restored Seuthes, Athens’ ally, as ruler. Near Corinth he commanded the army with such rigor that never in Greece were there better drilled troops or ones more obedient in following their officer’s orders; 2 he instilled in them the habit whereby once the general had given the signal for battle, they took up their positions in such a fashion, without any effort on their officer’s part, that each soldier seemed to have been assigned there by a very experienced commander. 3 With this army he destroyed a Spartan ‘mora,’ or infantry corps, a deed very greatly honored in all of Greece. Again in the same war he put all their troops to flight, as a consequence of which he won considerable glory. 4 When Artaxerxes II wanted to wage war on the king of Egypt, he asked the Athenians for Iphicrates as a general, and he put him in charge of an army of twelve thousand mercenaries. He instructed them so well in the whole field of military discipline that just as formerly the soldiers of the famous general Fabius were called true Romans, so Iphicrates’ soldiers were the most highly esteemed among the Greeks. 5 Moreover, having set out to support the Spartans, he checked the Theban Epaminondas’ assault. For had his arrival not been imminent, the Thebans would have withdrawn from Sparta only after they had captured the city and destroyed it by fire.\(^\text{54}\)

3 He possessed both great courage and a large frame, and the very appearance of his commanding physique inspired the admiration of all for him; 2 yet in work he was quite remiss and insufficiently forbearing, as Theopompos has reported; he was, however, a good citizen true to his word. This he proved on different occasions and, especially, in protecting the children of Amyntas III, king of Macedonia. For Eurydice, the mother of Perdiccas and Philippus, sought refuge for herself and these two boys with Iphicrates after Amyntas’ death, and she was kept safe thanks to his influence. 3 Regarded with goodwill by his fellow citizens, he lived to old age. Once he defended himself in a capital suit, during the Social War, along with Timotheus, and the court acquitted him.\(^\text{55}\) 4 He left a son, Menestheus, born of a Thracian woman, daughter of King Cotus. When asked whether he valued more his father or his mother, he said, “My mother.” This seemed surprising to all present, but he rejoined: “I declare so rightly: for my father, to the extent that he could, begot me a Thracian; conversely, my mother made me an Athenian.”

\(^{55}\) Also called the War of the Allies, 357—355. See Timotheus 3.2-5.
I Chabrias, an Athenian. He, too, has been reckoned among the most distinguished generals, and he accomplished many deeds worthy of recollection. But among them his innovation during the battle that he fought near Thebes, when he went to aid the Boeotians,\footnote{378} is especially outstanding. In that battle he held back the Spartan commander in chief Agesilaus, who was confident of victory after he had already put the mercenary troops to flight; Chabrias prohibited the phalanx remaining of the army from giving way and instructed his soldiers to receive the enemy’s attack with their shields at the knee and spears jutting out. Agesilaus, espying this innovation, did not dare to go on, and he had the trumpet sound the retreat for his forces, who were already charging. The expedient was attended by so much renown throughout Greece that Chabrias wanted the statue that the Athenians set up in the forum at public expense to represent him in this posture, by reason of which it happened that subsequently athletes and others exhibiting a skill have assumed, after having won a victory, their particular poses for statues erected in their honor.

2 Now, Chabrias directed many wars in Europe as the Athenians’ commander, but in Egypt he acted on his own account: having set out to help Nectanabis, he put his rule on a firm footing. He did the same in Cyprus, but then the Athenians sent him officially to aid King Evagoras,\footnote{379} and before departing from there, he had subdued the whole island by force of arms, owing to which the Athenians won considerable glory. Meanwhile war flared up between the Egyptians and the Persians. The Athenians had an alliance with Artaxerxes II, and the Spartans were allies of the Egyptians, from whom their king Agesilaus was gaining much profit. Seeing this, Chabrias, unwilling to be outdone by Agesilaus in anything, went on his own initiative to aid the Egyptians and presided over their fleet while Agesilaus commanded the infantry.

3 The Persian king’s prefects then sent ambassadors to Athens to complain because Chabrias was waging war together with the Egyptians on their king. The Athenians fixed a date before which Chabrias was to return home—they gave official warning that if he did not, they would condemn him on a capital charge. In compliance with this order he returned to Athens, but he did not tarry there any longer than was necessary. It indeed displeased him to be exposed to his compatriots’ view because he lived sumptuously and indulged himself too liberally for him to escape popular envy. It is, no doubt, a common flaw in great and independent states that envy accompanies glory and that the people slander with pleasure those whom they see stand out grander than others; nor do men of modest means gaze patiently on the good fortune of the wealthy. And so, to the extent that he could, Chabrias frequently was absent. Actually, he was not alone in staying away from Athens willingly, but nearly all her leaders have done likewise, since in so far as they thought to distance themselves from envy, they withdrew from their compatriots’ view. Accordingly, Conon lived much of the time in Cyprus, Iphicrates in Thrace, Timotheus in Lesbos, and Chares in Sigeum—Chares, of course, differed from these others with respect to conduct and, also, character, but notwithstanding, in Athens he was respected and powerful.

4 As for Chabrias, he perished during the Social War in the following manner. The Athenians were attacking Chius. Chabrias served under others’ orders in the fleet, but he surpassed in influence all those in the military command, and the fighting-men heeded him rather than their commanding officers. This circumstance hastened his death. For insomuch as he was
eager to enter the port first and he ordered the helmsman to direct the ship there, he caused his own undoing: once he had in fact entered it, the other vessels did not follow; thereupon a throng of enemies surrounded him, and while he was fighting most courageously, his ship, pierced by a rostrum, began to sink. Even though he could escape from there by throwing himself into the sea, since the Athenians’ fleet was near enough to rescue those swimming, he preferred to perish rather than throw down his weapons and abandon the ship that had conveyed him. The others refused to follow suit and swam to safety. But Chabrias deemed an honorable death better than a life of shame, and while fighting hand to hand he was cut down by his foes’ arms.
XIII. TIMOTHEUS

1 Timotheus, an Athenian, Conon’s son. He added through his many fine qualities to the renown inherited from his father, for he was well-spoken, diligent, hard-working, skilled in military matters and no less so in statecraft. 2 Several of his deeds deserve notice, but the following stand out especially. Through force of arms he made the Olynthians and Byzantines subject to Athens. He captured Samus. While besieging the fortified town in a previous war, the Athenians had spent one thousand two hundred talents, which he recovered for the people without any public outlay. He waged wars on King Cotus, and with spoils won from him he restored one thousand two hundred talents to Athens’ treasury. 3 He liberated the city of Cyzicus from a blockade. He set out with Agesilaus to aid Ariobarzanes, from whom the Spartan received ready money. Timotheus preferred, however, for his fellow citizens to be enriched through the acquisition of land and cities rather than for him to get cash payment, a part of which he could take to his own home. And so, he received the cities of Crithote and Sestus.

2 Further, while sailing around the Peloponnesus as commander of the fleet, he ravaged the Spartans’ territory, put their naval forces to flight, brought Corcyra under Athens’ control, and added as allies, besides, the people of Epirus, Athamania, Chaonia, and all those bordering on the Ionian Sea in that region. 2 Consequently, the Spartans abandoned their long-standing rivalry, yielded to Athens of their own accord precedence in maritime authority, and established peace terms by which the Athenians would rule the seas. The victory was so great an occasion for rejoicing among the citizens of Attica that then, for the first time, altars of Peace officially came into being, and an annual feast was instituted for this goddess. 3 In order that the recollection of his glory might endure, the Athenians placed at public expense a statue of Timotheus in the forum. Up to then he was the sole man to whom this honor fell, that is, after the people had erected a statue to commemorate the father, they dedicated one to the son as well. Thus the son’s recent statue set up near by refreshed the old recollection of the father.

3 When this man reached old age and had ceased assuming public offices, the Athenians began to be pressed on all sides by war. Samus had defected, the Hellespont had revolted, and Philippus II of Macedonia, already powerful at the time, was hatching many plots. Although Chares had been sent to oppose him, he was not thought to ensure adequate defense in this. 2 The Athenians named as commander Menestheus, son of Iphicrates and Timotheus’ son-in-law, and it was decreed that he should set out for the war. They gave him as counselors two men of superior experience and wisdom, his father and father-in-law, inasmuch as they trusted so much in their leadership as to entertain high hopes of recovering at their hands what had been lost. 3 They departed for Samus. When Chares learned that they were coming, he went with his troops to join them there so that nothing would appear to have been carried out without him present. It happened as they all were nearing the island that a violent tempest arose: the two veteran generals, judging it advisable to avoid the storm, anchored their fleet. 4 But Chares, pursuing a reckless course, did not yield to his elders’ view, just as though fate lay in his hands. He reached his destination, and he sent Timotheus and Iphicrates a message asking them to follow him to the same place. From there, after his defeat and the loss of a good many vessels, he retreated to his point of departure and sent an official letter to Athens wherein he asserted that it would have been easy for him to capture Samus if Timotheus and Iphicrates had not abandoned him. 5 The

58 366.
59 Satrap of Lydia, Ionia, and Phrygia.
people, impetuous, suspicious and for that reason fickle, hostile, and envious (besides, the two accused were powerful), called them home: they were charged with treason. The court found Timotheus guilty, and damages were assessed at one hundred talents. Driven by distaste for the ungrateful state, he went to Chalcis.

4 Since after his death the people regretted the sentence passed on him, they canceled nine tenths of the fine and ordered his son Conon to pay ten talents for repairing a certain part of the city wall. Herein one witnesses the inconstancy of Fortune. For with the utmost dishonor to his family, the grandson was obliged to repair from his patrimony those walls that his grandfather Conon had rebuilt for his native city out of booty won from her enemies. 2 While we could advance very much evidence of Timotheus’ orderly and wise lifestyle, we will content ourselves with a single instance from which one can readily infer how highly his associates regarded him. When as a young man he was brought to trial in Athens, not only friends and foreign private citizens as guests gathered to support him, but among them, too, was Jason of Pherae, tyrant of Thessaly, at that time the most powerful despot of all. 3 Even though in his own country he did not think himself safe without bodyguards, he went to Athens without any escort and held his host in such high esteem that he preferred to put his own life in danger rather than fail in his duty to Timotheus, who was fighting for his reputation. Nevertheless, later Timotheus waged war on him by order of the people: he deemed his native land’s rights more sacred than hospitality’s duties.

4 With Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus the age of great Athenian commanders ends, and after their passing, no general in that city was noteworthy. 5 I now come to a remarkably valiant man, the most able of all the non-Greek foreigners, save the two Carthaginians Hamilcar and Hannibal. 6 I will relate more about him than the others, both because his accomplishments are for the most part not so well-known and his successes occurred not due to a great number of soldiers but to his stratagems wherein he surpassed all in his day: one cannot understand clearly the events themselves without an explanation of the reasoning that brought him success.

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60 None the less, Nepos presents the biography of the Athenian Phocion later. Did he perhaps add it to a second edition?
XIV. DATAMES

1 Datames, the son of Camisares, a Carian, and a Scythian mother, made his start among the soldiers who guarded the royal palace in Artaxerxes II’s service. His father Camisares, because of his bravery in action, vigor in warfare, and repeated proof of loyalty to the king, was made governor of a province, a region of Cilicia inhabited by the White Syrians that borders on Cappadocia. 2 While performing military duty Datames demonstrated for the first time what he was worth in the war that the king waged on the Cusians. For although many thousands of king’s soldiers were slain there, his service proved to be of considerable value. Consequently, it happened after Camisares had fallen in this war that Datames received his father’s province.

2 He conducted himself with comparable valor later, when on the king’s order Autophrodates was waging war with rebels. Through his efforts the adversaries, who had already entered the royal camp, succumbed, and the remainder of the king’s army was saved, because of which he began to receive more important charges. 2 At that time Thuys, of an ancient family descended from the illustrious Pylaemenes whom, says Homer, Patroclus slew in the Trojan War, was a prince of Paphlagonia. He did not submit to the king’s will. 3 Accordingly the king decided to wage war on him, and to lead the campaign he appointed Datames, a relative of the Paphlagonian: in fact the father of one was the brother of the other’s mother. For this reason Datames at first preferred to try leading his relative back to his duty without warfare. When he went to him without guards, since he did not expect treachery from a friendly party, he almost perished: Thuys wanted to slay him by stealth. 4 Datames was in the company of his mother, the Paphlagonian’s aunt. She discovered what was afoot and warned her son. 5 He eluded the danger by fleeing and declared war on Thuys. Although Ariobazanes, governor of Lydia, Ionia, and all of Phrygia, had abandoned him during the war, he persevered none the less, and he captured Thuys alive together with his wife and children.

3 He took pains to reach the king before word of his exploit did. Therefore, unbeknownst to all he went to where the king was, and the following day he had Thuys, a man with a huge body and a frightening face, with dark skin and a long beard and hair, dressed in the very best attire that royal satraps customarily wore, and he adorned him besides with a gold necklace and armlets and other regal accoutrements. 2 Datames wore a rustic double mantle, a shaggy tunic, and a hunter’s helm on his head; in his right hand he held a cudgel and in the left, a leash attached to Thuys whom he drove before him as if he were guiding a wild beast that he had captured. 3 While all fixed their eyes on Thuys on account of his strange outfit and features—and for that reason a large crowd formed—various persons recognized him and reported it to the king. 4 At first he did not believe it, and so he sent Pharnabazus to investigate. When he learned about the exploit from him, he immediately ordered them to be admitted, as he was very much delighted by both the deed and the apparel, especially since it took him by surprise to find that this lofty king had come into his hands. 5 And thus, after having conferred splendid gifts on Datames, he sent him to the army that the commanders Pharnabazus and Tithraustes were gathering then for the war in Egypt, and he appointed him as their equal in authority. However, when the king recalled Pharnabazus later, he placed supreme command in Datames’ hands.

4 While he was putting together an army with the utmost diligence and was preparing to set off for Egypt, unexpectedly he received a letter from the king ordering him to attack Aspis, who had control of Cataonia: this province lies above Cilicia and borders on Cappadocia. 2 Now Aspis, who lived in a wooded region defended by redoubts, not only refused to submit to the
king’s authority, but he also harassed neighboring countries and took by force goods being conveyed to the king. 3 Even though Datames was far from those regions and he was being drawn away from a more important mission, nevertheless he deemed that he should comply with the king’s will. Therefore, he boarded a ship with a small but valiant detachment, since he judged it easier (as it occurred) for him to subdue with a small armed force someone unsuspecting than to put down with ever so large an army a well-prepared opponent. 4 He sailed to Cilicia, where he disembarked, and marching day and night he crossed the Taurus Range and arrived at his destination. He sought Aspis’ whereabouts; he learned that he was close by and that he had gone hunting. While he was reconnoitering, the reason for his arrival became known. Aspis got the Pisidians ready to put up resistance along with those accompanying him. 5 When Datames found out, he took up his weapons and ordered his men to follow; he himself rode off on his speeding horse towards the enemy. When from a distance Aspis saw him bearing down on him, he became quite frightened, and discouraged from any attempt at resistance, he surrendered. Datames handed the shackled Aspis over to Mithridates for conveyance to the king.

5 While these events were taking place, Artaxerxes, calling to mind that he had sent his principal general away from so important a war to a very minor operation, rebuked himself, and since he thought that Datames was still with the army at Acre, he dispatched a messenger there to say that he should remain with the troops. Before reaching his destination, he met en route the men who were conducting Aspis. 2 The high degree of the king’s favor that Datames won through his swift action was matched by the courtiers’ envy inasmuch as they saw him alone become more valued than all of them. Consequently, together they plotted to subvert him. 3 With regard to this matter Pandantes, the royal treasurer and Datames’ friend, sent him a detailed written account in which he informed him that he would be in great danger if anything unfavorable occurred in Egypt with him in command. 4 For such is the habit of kings to hold men responsible for misfortunes and attribute success to their own good luck: therefore it happens that they are readily persuaded to do away with generals about whose defeat they receive news. He would be in even graver jeopardy since the king’s closest advisers were Datames’ worst enemies. 5 He read the letter, as he had already returned to the army at Acre, and since he recognized that what it said was true, he decided to break with the king. He did nothing, however, that might bring him dishonor. 6 He put Mandrocles of Magnesia in charge of the army; while concealing his intention respecting the king, he departed with his own men for Cappadocia and occupied nearby Paphlagonia. Secretly he formed an alliance with Ariobarzanes, gathered a small army, and turned over to his men fortified cities to defend.

6 But due to winter weather these matters progressed not altogether favorably. He heard that the Pisidians were gathering some troops to fight against him. He sent his son Arsideus there with an army. The young man was slain in the ensuing battle. Thereupon the father set out with a rather small force while hiding how grave a wound he had received, because he wanted to reach the enemy before his men got news of the defeat so that they would not be disheartened in learning of his son’s death. 2 Upon arriving at his destination, he set up camp in a spot where he could neither be surrounded by the large number of his adversaries nor be hindered himself from using the force that he had at hand for fighting. 3 His father-in-law Mithrobazanes, commander of the cavalry, accompanied him; in view of his son-in-law’s desperate situation, he deserted to the enemy. When Datames heard this, he felt that if word got out among the rank and file that such a close kinsman had abandoned him, the others would do the same. 4 He let it be known among the common soldiers that on his order Mithrobazanes had departed as if he were
deserting so as to slay their foes more easily after they had taken him in: therefore, it would be wrong to abandon him, and all ought to follow him without delay; for if they fought strenuously, their foes could not withstand them, since they would be cut down both inside and outside their palisade. 5 Having won their approval, he led out the army. He pursued Mithrobarzanes: only when the latter had reached the enemy did Datames give the order to charge. 6 The Pisidians, unsettled by this odd maneuver, were led to suppose that the deserters had acted in bad faith in concert with Datames’ soldiers so that once admitted, they would cause greater damage; they attacked Mithrobarzanes’ soldiers first. While the turncoats did not understand what was happening or why, they were compelled to fight against those to whom they had deserted and take a stand with the men whom they had abandoned. As neither side spared them, they were cut down quickly. 7 Datames attacked the Pisidians who remained and stood their ground: he put them to flight with his first assault, pursued the fugitives, slew many of them, and captured the enemy camp. 8 By means of this stratagem he trounced the deserters and finished off the enemy concurrently, and he transformed into his salvation what had been intended to lead to his destruction. We have read nowhere either of a more ingenious plan of any commander or one carried out more quickly.

7 Nevertheless, Sysinas, his eldest son, broke ties with this great man and crossed over to the king, to whom he announced his father’s defection. Disturbed by this news, Artaxerxes, since he knew that he was dealing with a brave and vigorous man who, after reflection, dared to execute his plan and who was wont to reflect before acting, sent Autophrodates to Cappadocia. 2 To prevent him from gaining entry there, Datames took pains to occupy beforehand the gorge in which the Cilician Gates lie. 3 But he was unable to assemble his troops at such short notice. Deterred from that operation, together with the small armed force that he had gathered he chose a certain spot where his foes could neither surround him nor pass by without being trapped in a perilous position, and if his adversary meant to fight there, the multitude of his troops could not do much harm to the small number of Datames’ soldiers.

8 Even though Autophrodates saw this, still he decided to fight rather than retreat with so many troops or remain encamped so long in a single place. 2 He had twenty thousand Persian cavalrymen, one hundred thousand mercenary infantrymen whom they call ‘cardaces,’ and three thousand slingers from the same nation; moreover, he had eight thousand Cappadocians, ten thousand Armenians, five thousand Paphlagonians, ten thousand Phrygians, five thousand Lydians, about three thousand from Aspendus and Pisidia, two thousand Cilicians, just as many Captiani, three thousand Greek mercenaries, and a very large number of light-armed soldiers. 3 Against these troops Datames’ hope rested wholly on himself and the nature of the terrain: for on his side he had not even one twentieth as many soldiers. Counting on them, he did battle and cut down several thousands of the enemy, while not more than a thousand men from his own army were slain, for which reason the following day he erected a victory memorial at the site where the battle had taken place. 4 From there he moved his camp, and although always inferior with respect to the number of troops, he came off victorious in all battles because he never engaged in close combat except when he had entrapped the enemy in a defile, which was often the case since he was familiar with the regions and he formed plans shrewdly. 5 Seeing the war drag on with more serious damage to the king than his adversaries, Autophrodates pressed for peace and amity so that Datames might thus regain the king’s favor. 6 Even though Datames did

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61 An error or lacuna in the manuscripts? When did Datames order the attack on the turncoats?
not think the settlement trustworthy, none the less he accepted it and said that he would send representatives to Artaxerxes. Thus the war the king had undertaken against Datames was stilled. Autophrodates withdrew to Phrygia.

9 But the king, in his implaceable hatred of Datames, strove to have him slain through treachery when he realized that he could not crush him through warfare. Datames eluded very many of the traps laid for him. 2 For instance, since his rivals had informed him that certain men who ranked among his friends (concerning whom he considered that he should neither believe nor disregard what his enemies had related) planned to waylay him, he wanted to find out if the report was true or false. 3 And so, he set out for the place en route to which they had said that the ambush would occur. But he selected someone very similar to himself in body and stature, gave him his own clothing, and ordered him to take the position in the column where he himself usually marched. With soldierly equipment and attire Datames undertook the journey among the bodyguards. 4 Then, as soon as the column arrived at the place where men were waiting in ambush, the latter, fooled by the order of march as well as the clothing, lunged at the substitute. But beforehand Datames had told those marching with him to be ready to imitate what they saw him do. 5 As soon as he observed the waylayers rush together, he threw his darts towards them. When all his bodyguards followed suit, the assailants fell transfixed before reaching the person whom they intended to attack.

10 All the same, in the end this ever so shrewd man was taken in by the trickery of Mithridates, son of Ariobarzanes. The fact is that he promised Artaxerxes to slay him if the king permitted him to do whatever he wished with impunity and if he pledged his word to that effect in the Persian fashion, with the right hand. 2 Having received the pledge from the king’s messenger, he gathered troops and from a distance formed an alliance with Datames; he attacked the king’s provinces, stormed his strongholds, and took a good deal of booty, some of which he distributed among his men and some he sent to Datames; likewise he handed over several fortresses to him. 3 By doing so for a long time, he convinced our man that he had embarked on an unlimited war against the king while, however, in order to keep Datames from suspecting treachery, he sought neither to converse with him nor appear before him. Thus he managed their alliance from a distance so that they would seem to be united not through mutual benefits but their shared enmity with regard to the king.

11 When he believed that he had proven this sufficiently, he informed Datames that it was the right time to gather larger armies and wage war on the king himself and that he would go to discuss the matter with him, if he saw fit, wherever he proposed. Datames consented, and they chose a date for the meeting and agreed upon the site. 2 A few days before the conference Mithridates went there with a single man whom he trusted the most, and he buried swords in several different places, which he marked carefully. On the very day of the interview both Mithridates and Datames had men examine the site and search them, too, for weapons; then they met face to face. 3 Having conferred here for some time, they departed in opposite directions. Datames was already a good distance away when Mithridates returned to the same place before reaching his own men so as not to arouse suspicion, and while he acted as if he wanted to rest on account of weariness, he sat down where a weapon had been buried; feigning that he had forgotten to mention something during their conversation, he called Datames back. 4 Meanwhile he unearthed the hidden arm, unsheathed it, and concealed it in his clothing. As Datames was approaching, he said to him that in departing he had noticed a certain location, within sight from there, suitable for setting up camp. 5 While he was pointing to the spot and Datames turned to
look back *at it*, he ran him through from behind with the sword, and he slew him before anyone could come to *his* aid. Thus this illustrious man, who had overcome many through his stratagems *but* no one through treachery, was taken in by feigned friendship.
XV. EPAMINONDAS

1 Epaminondas, a Theban, son of Polymnis. Before I write about him, it seems appropriate to caution readers not to evaluate foreign customs on the basis of their own or suppose that what they consider rather trivial was regarded in like manner among other peoples. 2 We recognize, for example, that according to our mores musical performance does not befit a leading citizen’s role, and dancing is even included among the vices: the Greeks deemed all such activities both becoming and praiseworthy. 3 Since, however, I wish to portray a close likeness of Epaminondas’ bearing and career, I believe that I should overlook nothing suitable for delineating it. 4 Therefore I shall comment first on his family, next, the scope of his education and his teachers, then, his character, inborn capacities, and whatever other traits are worth recollecting, and, finally, his exploits, which many authors esteem more highly than his fine intellectual qualities.

2 So then, Epaminondas, born to the father just mentioned, belonged to an honorable family. His forefathers had left him what was by then a modest estate; yet no Theban received a better education. For he learned to play the lyre and sing to stringed accompaniment as well from Dionysius, no less renowned among musicians than Damon or Lamprus, whose names are widely known; he learned to play the flute from Olympiodorus and to dance from Calliphrhon. 2 What is more, his philosophy teacher was Lysis of Tarentum, a Pythagorean, to whom he was so devoted that in his youth he preferred this serious and austere old man as an intimate to all those of his own age; nor did he part company with him before he surpassed his fellow students in learning by so much that it could easily be discerned that he would likewise outdo them all in every other respect. 3 And I add that according to our customs things of this sort are trifling and even unworthy; on the other hand in Greece, at least in the past, they were highly praised. 4 When he reached military age and began to apply himself to exercise in the palaestra, he concentrated more on agility than great strength: for he regarded the latter as suitable for athletes’ needs and the former for usefulness in war. 5 Therefore he trained himself especially in running and wrestling but only until he could grasp someone in his arms and fight while standing. To be sure, he devoted a large part of his zeal to weapons and their use.

3 Even more intellectual advantages accompanied his physical stamina. He was restrained, prudent, serious; he made wise use of opportunities; he was experienced in warfare, courageous in combat, very high-minded, and so conscientious regarding the truth that he did not lie even in jest. 2 He also showed self-control, compassion, and forbearance to a remarkable degree, as he tolerated not only affronts from the populace but those of his comrades, too; above all, he knew how to keep secrets, and something that occasionally is no less useful than eloquent speech, he listened diligently inasmuch as he supposed that he would acquire knowledge most readily in this way. 3 And so, when he went to a meeting where there was either a debate about government or a philosophical discourse, he never departed before the discussion drew to a close. 4 He bore his limited fortune so lightly that he reaped nothing from his services to the state but honor. He abstained from accepting his friends’ resources in order to look after himself; but to help others in need, he often used his credit with them in such a way that it could be deemed that he and his associates shared everything in common. 5 For when foes had captured anyone of his fellow citizens or a friend’s marriageable daughter could not contract matrimony on account of narrow means, he gathered his acquaintances to take counsel and decided how much each would give in proportion to his resources. 6 When he had reached the required amount, instead of
receiving it, he led the solicitant to the contributors, and he had them pay out the money to him so that the person to whom the sum was going would know how much he was indebted to each of them.

4 His integrity was put to the test, however, by Diomedon of Cyzicus: for at King Artaxerxes II’s behest, he had undertaken to corrupt Epaminondas with money. He went to Thebes with a substantial amount in gold, and with five talents he induced the youth Micythus, whom Epaminondas loved very much then, to do what he wanted. Micythus met with Epaminondas and made known the reason for Diomedon’s arrival. 2 But Epaminondas told Diomedon in person: “No money is necessary: for if the king wants what is advantageous to the Thebans, I am ready to act for nothing; but on the other hand, he does not have enough gold and silver to buy my assistance if he wants anything contrary to their interests, since I am unwilling to exchange my love of country for all the riches in the world. 3 As for you, you tempted me because you did not know me, and you judged me to be similar to yourself; that does not surprise me, and I forgive you; but depart quickly so as not to corrupt others, since you could not bribe me. And you, Micythus, you return this man’s money—unless you do so at once, I will hand you over to the magistrates.” 4 When Diomedon asked to be allowed to depart in safety and take away with him the possessions that he had brought there, Epaminondas replied: “Not in your interest but my own I will indeed do as you ask, so that if somebody carries off your money, no one may say that what I had refused to accept when offered I laid hold of later by theft.” 5 When he asked Diomedon where to have him taken, and he replied, to Athens, Epaminondas gave him an escort in order for him to arrive there safely. And he did not consider even that sufficient, but, further, he had the Athenian Chabrias, to whom I referred earlier, see to it that he boarded a ship unharmed. 6 This will serve as adequate proof of his integrity. I could surely publish very many examples, but measure must be applied seeing that I have resolved to include in this single volume the lives of numerous distinguished men whose particular exploits not a few authors before us have set forth in many thousands of lines.

5 Moreover, he was articulate, as no Theban equaled him in eloquence, nor was he less apt in his repartees than elegant in a prepared speech. 2 A certain Meneclides, also a Theban, disparaged him and vied with him for management of the state; he specified well enough, that is to say, for a Theban, since physical strength is more characteristic of that people than intellectual qualities. 3 Since he saw that Epaminondas was eminent in the art of warfare, he used to advise the Thebans to prefer peace to war—and he did this so that his rival’s services would not be called for. Epaminondas said to him: “You deceive your fellow citizens in speaking inasmuch as you call them away from armed conflict; you procure slavery for them in the name of peace. 4 For peace is acquired through warfare. And thus, those who would enjoy lasting peace ought to be trained for war. Therefore, if you Thebans want to predominate in Greece, you should avail yourselves of military camps, not gymnasiuims.” 5 When the same Meneclides reproached him because he had no children and remained unmarried, and he censured especially his arrogance, as he thought to have attained to Agamemnon’s glory in warfare, Epaminondas, for his part, replied: “Meneclides, cease casting blame on me with respect to a wife: for there is no one’s advice in this matter that I am less willing to follow than yours.” Meneclides was indeed suspected of adultery. 6 “Then again, you err in imagining that I vie with Agamemnon. For he, together with all of Greece, conquered with difficulty a single city in ten years, while I, on the contrary, by means of our city alone and in a single day, put the Spartans to flight and freed all of Greece.”
6 Furthermore, he went to an assembly of the Arcadians whom he entreated to form a coalition with the Thebans and Argives, and in opposition Callistratus, Athens’ envoy superior to all in eloquence at the time, asked them, rather, to pursue an alliance with the people of Attica. In his speech the latter dealt the Thebans and Argives many a blow, 2 and among them he asserted that the Arcadians ought to pay attention to what sort of citizens both cities had produced, from whose examples they could form an opinion regarding the others: for instance, the matricides Orestes and Alcmaeon were in fact Argives, and Oedipus, born in Thebes, begot children on his mother after he had slain his father. 3 In his response Epaminondas, having dealt thoroughly with each of the other arguments, then came to these two reproaches; he expressed surprise at the Attic orator’s inattentiveness in not noticing that those men were born innocent in their respective cities, but the Athenians welcomed them after their homelands had banished them on account of their crimes. 4 But especially brilliant was his eloquence as an emissary at Sparta before the battle of Leuctra. When the envoys from all of the allies had gathered there, he demonstrated so conclusively the Lacedaemonians’ despotism before the very large assembly that by means of that noted speech he shattered their military resources no less than at the battle of Leuctra. He brought it about then, as became clear later, that the Spartans were deprived of their allies’ aid.

7 Forbearing he endured affronts from his compatriots, since he thought that it would be impious for him to show resentment towards his native city, and here is proof of it: owing to envy his fellow citizens refused to put him in charge of the army, and they selected a leader inexperienced in warfare due to whose error the large body of soldiers was led so far astray that they all feared for their safety, as they were hemmed in by a narrow pass where the enemy blockaded them, and they began to feel the want of Epaminondas’ circumspection. On that occasion he was serving without a commission among the soldiers. 2 When they sought his help, he put aside any thought of the affront, and after having freed the army from the blockade, he led it back home safe and sound. Actually, he did not behave thus just once but rather often. 3 This was particularly evident when he led the army into the Peloponnesus against the Spartans along with his two copartners, one of whom was Pelopidas, a brave and energetic man. When all three had become unpopular because of their Theban adversaries’ accusations and, as a result, their right of command had been annulled and other generals had been named to replace them, 4 Epaminondas disobeyed the people’s decree, persuaded his colleagues to do likewise, and pursued the war he had undertaken. For he realized that unless he did so, the whole army would be destroyed due to the generals’ lack of skill and experience in warfare. 5 There was a Theban law that punished with death anyone who retained his command longer than he was legally empowered. While Epaminondas recognized that this law had been created for the sake of preserving the commonwealth, he was unwilling to let it contribute to the state’s destruction, and he carried on command four months longer than the people had decreed.

8 When the three returned home, his colleagues were prosecuted on that charge. Epaminondas permitted them to shift the burden of the defense entirely on himself and to insist that they had disobeyed the law owing to his efforts. Inasmuch as both escaped the death sentence by means of this defense, no one believed that Epaminondas would appear to answer the charge since he had nothing to plead in his own defense. 2 But he went before the court, denied nothing of his adversaries’ accusations, and acknowledged everything that his colleagues had said, nor did he object to undergoing the legal punishment, but he sought only from his judges that they write the following in the record of his conviction: 3 “The Thebans condemned Epaminondas to death because he forced them at Leuctra to defeat the Spartans, whom no
Boeotian had dared to behold in battle array before he became commander, and because in a single battle not only did he rescue Thebes from ruin but set all of Greece free as well, and he brought the situation of both parties to the point where the Thebans attacked Sparta and the Lacedaemonians thought it enough if they could save themselves, nor did he desist from waging war until he had blockaded their city through the restoration of Messene. When he had said this, everyone broke out laughing hilariously, and no juror dared to vote in his case. Thus he departed from the capital trial with the greatest glory.

At the close of his career as commander at Mantinea, in the battle line he was pressing the enemy too daringly when the Spartans recognized him, and since they believed that the safety of their homeland depended on the elimination of this sole man, all together they charged with a view to him alone, and they did not cease until after a great massacre wherein many fell they saw Epaminondas himself, who was fighting most bravely, fall, struck by a spear thrown from a distance. The Boeotians were hindered somewhat on account of his fall; nevertheless, they did not quit fighting before they defeated their adversaries. But when Epaminondas realized that he had received a lethal wound and, also, that if he removed the iron tip, which, separated from the shaft, remained in his body, he would die on the spot, he kept it there until the moment when the Boeotians’ victory was announced. On hearing this he said: “I have lived fully, for I die undefeated.” Then, following the tip’s removal, he expired at once.

He never married. Pelopidas, who had a disreputable son, reproached him in this regard and asserted that he looked after his homeland poorly in not leaving children. Epaminondas replied: “Take care yourself, you who will leave the likes of your son, not to serve it even worse. And certainly I cannot want for offspring, for in fact I leave as my daughter the battle of Leuctra, which is fated not merely to survive me but to be immortal as well.” At the time when under Pelopidas’ leadership Theban exiles took possession of their own city and drove a Spartan garrison from the citadel, all the while the bloodshed among fellow citizens continued, Epaminondas stayed at home, for he wished neither to side with those unpatriotic men who supported the Spartans nor to fight them lest he stain his hands with their blood: he considered every victory over one’s compatriots to be baleful. But when fighting with the Spartans broke out at the Cadmea, the very same man stood in the front rank.

I shall have said enough about his achievements and career if I add a single thing that no one will deny: both before Epaminondas’ birth and after his death Thebes was continuously subordinate to foreign leadership while, on the contrary, as long as he held the reins of state, it led all Greece. Therefore one can conclude that this man alone was worth more than his fellow citizens as a whole.

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62 See Iphicrates 2.5, Pelopidas 4.3, and Agesilaus 6.1. Also, the battle of Leuctra took place in 371.
XVI. PELOPIDAS

1 Pelopidas, a Theban, is better known to historians than to the people at large. I hesitate as to the manner in which to relate his achievements, since I fear that if I undertake a full development of his exploits, I may seem to be composing a history rather than a detailed biography; but if I touch solely on the main points, how great a man he was may appear less obvious to those lacking in knowledge of Greek letters. Therefore I shall anticipate both concerns as best I can in applying preventive remedies for boredom as well as the want of knowledge on my readers’ part.

2 While the Spartan Phoebidas was leading the army to Olynthus and was going by Thebes, he seized the town’s citadel, called the Cadmea, at the prompting of a small number of Thebans who sided with the Spartans in order to confront more easily an opposing Theban faction, and he decided to do so on his own account, without his government’s bidding.63 Consequently the Spartans removed him from command of the army and imposed on him a fine; but all the same, they did not restore the citadel to the Thebans, because they thought it better, after having provoked their enmity, to keep them under guard rather than liberate them. For after the Peloponnesian War and Athens’ defeat, they deemed that they would have to deal with the Thebans, who alone would dare to stand up against them. 4 With this in mind they had conferred the highest public offices on their partisans and had either slain or driven into exile the chief members of the other faction: among them our man Pelopidas, about whom I have undertaken to write, was driven out, deprived of his homeland.

2 Nearly all the exiles went to Athens, not to pursue leisure there but to set about recovering their native city from near by once Fortune offered them the opportunity. 2 And so, as soon as the moment seemed right for action, jointly with those in Thebes who shared their views they selected a day for taking their enemies by surprise and freeing their city—that is, at a time when the principal Theban magistrates were accustomed to attend a banquet together. 3 Not especially extensive resources have often produced something momentous, but certainly never has so insignificant a beginning put an end to such a mighty force. For a dozen youths united from among those punished with banishment, and there were altogether not more than one hundred who exposed themselves to so much peril. The Spartans’ power was dealt a hard blow by that small number. 4 They in fact launched an attack no less against the Spartans, who at the time took the lead throughout Greece, than against the faction that opposed them: not much later, at the battle of Leuctra, the Spartans fell from hegemony’s place of pride after this initial blow.

5 Now, when those twelve, led by Pelopidas, left Athens by day so as to arrive in Thebes at dusk, they set out in rustic dress along with hunting dogs and nets in order to arouse less suspicion as they traveled. Arriving precisely at the prearranged time of day, they went to the home of Charon, who held the highest office in Thebes at the time; it described in detail everything concerning the exiles’ departure. Archias was already reclining on a couch at the

63 382.
banquet, and when the letter reached him, he tossed it, sealed as it was, under his cushion and said: “I put off serious business till tomorrow.” 3 But all those men, inebriated since the night’s activity had already progressed, were slain by the exiles under Pelopidas’ leadership. After they had accomplished this, they summoned the people to take up arms and liberate themselves. Not only the city dwellers but those, too, from the countryside all around rushed there en masse, drove the Lacedaemonian garrison from the citadel, freed their native city from pressing danger, and slew some of the instigators of the Cadmea’s seizure and drove the others into exile. 64

4 During this very troubled time Epaminondas, as I pointed out above, remained inactive at home as long as his compatriots were fighting one another. And so, the glory for freeing Thebes goes particularly to Pelopidas, but nearly all the rest of his praiseworthy deeds he performed jointly with Epaminondas. 2 For example, at the battle of Leuctra, with Epaminondas as commander in chief, Pelopidas led the Sacred Band, an elite corps that was the first to crush the Spartans’ phalanx. 3 Moreover, he took part in all his dangerous undertakings, as in commanding one of the two wings during the attack on Sparta. He also went to the Persians as an ambassador to hasten the restoration of Messene. In brief, he was one of the two most important persons in Thebes, and albeit second in standing, he was none the less closest to Epaminondas.

5 All the same, he had his share of adverse fortune as well. For at the beginning, as I indicated, an exile he was deprived of his homeland, and when he wanted to bring Thessaly under the Thebans’ control and he thought himself sufficiently protected by ambassadorial prerogative, since all nations were accustomed to consider it inviolable, the tyrant Alexander of Pherae seized him along with Ismenias and imprisoned them. 2 While waging a war of retribution on Alexander, Epaminondas freed him. After that deed Pelopidas could never dispel the hatred that he felt for the man who had done him violence. Therefore he persuaded the Thebans to aid Thessaly by driving out its despots. 3 When he had assumed supreme command in the war and had departed with the army for Thessaly, he did not hesitate to clash with his foes as soon as he caught sight of them. 4 He recognized Alexander in the course of the battle; burning with anger he galloped off on his horse towards him and, having distanced himself from his men, fell transfixed by a volley of javelins. And yet, this came in the wake of victory, for the despots’ troops had already fallen back. 5 On account of this accomplishment, all the cities of Thessaly bestowed on the slain Pelopidas gilt crowns and bronze statues and on his children, a good deal of land.

64 379—378. Quite often Nepos relates in much detail stratagems involving assassinations. The present account does not indicate how the assassins got close enough to their several victims, presumably protected by guards. Xenophon, Pelopidas’ contemporary, reports in Hellenica V.4.1-4 two versions of the Theban assassins’ stratagem: posing as revelers, seven exiles burst into the banquet room after the dinner, or the seven, veiled and disguised as courtesans and their handmaidens, were admitted to serve as after-dinner entertainment for the guests. Xenophon does not name Pelopidas as one of the conspirators. Although Nepos names Xenophon in the first sentence of the next biography, it seems unlikely that he knew Xenophon’s detailed reports in this instance.
XVII. AGESILAUS

1 Agesilaus II, a Spartan. Not only all other historians, but especially his very close companion Xenophon, Socrates’ disciple, have heaped praise on him. 2 He vied at first with Leotychides, his brother’s son, for the kingship. The Lacedaemonian forefathers had handed down the custom of always having two kings, more in name than in authority, from the two families of Procles and Eurysthenes, the first kings of Sparta and descendants of Hercules. 3 It was not permitted for a member of one family to take the place of someone from the other: thus both preserved their status. When a reigning king had died, his eldest son was considered first to succeed him; but if he had left no son, then his nearest male blood relation was chosen. 4 King Agis II, Agesilaus’ brother, had died leaving a son, Leotychides. 5 He had not acknowledged him at birth, but dying he did so. Leotychides contended with his uncle for the title of king but without success. 5 Supported by Lysander, a seditious and powerful man at the time, as I showed earlier, Agesilaus was chosen.

2 As soon as he became king, he persuaded the Spartans to send forth armies into Asia and wage war on the Persian king, and he explained that it was preferable to fight in Asia rather than Europe. As a matter of fact, word had got out that Artaxerxes II was putting together naval and land forces to send to Greece. 2 Having received authorization Agesilaus acted with such speed that he arrived in Asia with troops before the king’s satraps realized that he had set out. Consequently, he found them all unprepared and off their guard. 3 When Tissaphernes, who exercised the highest authority then among the royal governors, learned this, he sought a truce with the Spartan; while he feigned to be taking pains to bring about an agreement between the Lacedaemonians and the king, his real objective, however, was to gather troops, and he obtained a three-month truce. 4 Both swore to maintain the truce in good faith. Agesilaus stuck by the compact most faithfully, whereas Tissaphernes, on the contrary, did nothing but prepare for war. 5 Even though the Spartan realized it, he kept his word all the same and said that he gained much therein, since Tissaphernes, on account of his breach of oath, alienated men from his endeavors and brought the wrath of the gods down on himself as well; on the other hand, due to the fact that he maintained his sacred promise, he enheartened his own troops who observed the gods to be favorable to their side and men more friendly towards them, inasmuch as both are wont to favor those whom they see keeping their word of honor.

3 When the period of the truce ended, Tissaphernes, who possessed very many estates in Caria, considered by far the richest province at the time, was certain that his adversaries would attack it especially, and he assembled his whole fighting force there. 2 But Agesilaus headed for Phrygia, and he pillaged it before Tissaphernes stirred. After his soldiers had become rich owing to abundant booty, he led the army back to Ephesus to winter; having set up works there for making weapons, he prepared very assiduously for war. And so that their arms might be produced with greater zeal and decorated more strikingly, he offered prizes to those whose diligence was outstanding in this regard. 3 He did the same with respect to different kinds of training: he bestowed significant boons on soldiers who were superior to the rest. As a result he brought it about, in short, that the army was both quite handsomely fitted out and thoroughly trained. 4 When he thought the time right to remove his troops from winter encampment, he knew that if he announced openly where he was going to march, his foes would not believe it and

65 It was rumored that Alcibiades had fathered him.
66 Agesilaus became king around 398. He and Lysander had been eromenos and erastes some time earlier.
would occupy other regions with garrisons, nor would they doubt that he was going to do other than what he had proclaimed. And so, since he had said that he would go to Sardis, Tissaphernes believed that it was again Caria that he should protect. When this supposition led him into error and he realized that he had been outsmarted, he set out too late to defend Sardis: when he arrived there, Agesilas had already attacked many places and acquired a good deal of plunder. But since the Spartan saw that his foes were superior with respect to their cavalry, he never accepted combat on the open plain but fought hand to hand in spots where his infantry was more advantageous. Therefore he drove back much larger enemy forces however often he fought, and in the opinion of all he carried out operations so well in Asia that they considered him the victor.

While he was planning then to advance against the Persians and attack the king in person, a message sent to him by the ephors at home arrived: the Athenians and Boeotians had declared war on the Lacedaemonians, and, therefore, he should return immediately. In this his sense of duty ought to be admired no less than his bravery in war: although he commanded a triumphant army and felt certain to take possession of the Persians’ realm, he obeyed as submissively what the distant magistrates had ordered as if he were an ordinary citizen in Sparta’s comitia. Would that our generals had been willing to follow his example! But let us get back to the subject. Agesilas preferred a good reputation to the richest kingdom, and he considered it much more glorious for him to obey his homeland’s decrees than to conquer Asia through warfare. So then, with that in mind he took his troops across the Hellespont, and he did it with such speed that he made in thirty days the journey that Xerxes I had taken a year to complete. When he was already but a short distance from the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, the Boeotians, and the rest of their coalition attempted to block his way near Coronea: he defeated them all in a fierce battle. The very greatest glory of this victory was in the following: a good many fugitives had rushed together into the temple of Minerva, and when asked what he wanted done with them, even though he had received several wounds in the battle and clearly appeared vexed with all who had borne arms in opposition, nevertheless he put religious scruple before anger, and he forbade the violation of their sacred right. Nor, truly, in Greece alone did he act so as to preserve the sanctity of the gods’ temples, but among foreigners, too, with the utmost religious respect he kept all the statues and altars intact. Accordingly he used to proclaim that he was surprised that people who had harmed those imploring the gods were not regarded as sacrilegists or that more severe penalties were not inflicted on profaners of a sacred place than on despoilers of temples.

After this conflict the entire war was waged in the vicinity of Corinth, and hence it was named the Corinthian War. When in a single battle there with Agesilaus as commander ten thousand enemy soldiers were slain, and consequently his adversaries’ might appeared to be broken, he was so disinclined to brag of victory that he lamented Greece’s lot, inasmuch as so many had perished through his foes’ fault: for with that great number, had Greece been disposed to reason, it would have been possible for her to punish the Persians. Moreover, after he had driven the enemy inside the town walls, many urged him to storm Corinth, but he asserted that it was inconsistent with his character: he declared that he was indeed the sort of man who compelled the wayward to return to a sense of duty, not one who would assail Greece’s most

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67 Cf. Themistocles 5.2. Xerxes covered the distance from Persia to Greece in four months and completed the return trip in a month and a half.

68 394.
excellent cities. 4 He said: “For were we willing to destroy those who have stood with us against
the foreigners, we would defeat ourselves while our enemies stand by and watch. Once we have
done so, they will overpower us easily whenever they choose.”

6 Meanwhile that well-known calamity at Leuctra befell the Spartans. Although very
many pressed him to set out for there, just as if he foresaw the outcome he refused to depart. 69
Further, while Epaminondas was attacking Sparta, which had no defensive walls, he showed
himself to be so excellent a commander that it was clear to everyone at the time that Sparta would
have ceased to exist had it not been for him. 2 Truly, in this perilous situation his quick thinking
saved all his fellow citizens. For when certain young men, quite frightened owing to the enemy’s
arrival, intended to desert to the Thebans and had occupied an elevated place outside the city,
Agesilaus, seeing that it would be very detrimental if it became known that someone was
attempting to desert to the enemy, went there with his men, and he praised the youths’ plan as if
they had acted with good intention in occupying the spot, an action that he, too, had recognized
as necessary. 3 Thus with feigned praise he won the young men back to his side, and now that his
companions had joined them, he left the place secure, because with their number increased by
men not party to their scheme, the youths did not dare to make a move, and they desisted all the
more willingly since they thought that what they had planned remained secret.

7 Unquestionably, after the battle of Leuctra the Spartans never regained their strength or
former leadership, even though all the while Agesilaus never gave up doing whatever he could to
help his native city. 2 For instance, as the Spartans were chiefly in need of money, he lent his aid
to all who had revolted against the Persian king: they gave him a good deal of money with which
he relieved his homeland. 3 And, moreover, particularly admirable in the case of this man was the
fact that although kings, princes, and states bestowed on him very splendid gifts, he never took
anything to his own home, and he changed nothing of the Lacedaemonians’ customary lifestyle
and dress. 4 He was content with the very house that Eurysthenes, the founder of his lineage, had
used: upon entering it one could find no sign of pleasure-seeking or extravagance—on the
contrary, one saw many indications of forbearance and modesty. It was furnished so as to differ
in nothing from the house of any mere citizen of meager means.

8 And yet, to the same degree that Nature favored this most remarkable man in conferring
upon him superior character traits, she did him an ill turn in shaping his body: he was short of
stature, slight in frame, and lame in one foot as well, which indeed produced a rather uncomely
look, and strangers considering his appearance thought little of him; but those who knew of his
achievements could not admire him enough. 2 That is what happened to him when at the age of
eighty he went to aid Pharaoh Tachus in Egypt. He was reclining for a meal with his men on the
beach without any canopy, and straw covering the ground with nothing more than a pelt tossed on top
served as a couch. In the same spot all his companions were reclining in common, threadbare
dress: in effect, their apparel suggested not only that no king was among them, but it led one to
believe that they were far from well-to-do. 3 As soon as news of his arrival had reached the royal
officers, they quickly conveyed there gifts of every sort. The foreigners seeking Agesilaus could
69 Most editors find this Latin sentence quite awkward, unclear, or corrupt and in need of correction. A scribal
intervention possibly accounts for its questionable form. The first three words, quo ne proficisceretur, are suspect,
since they provide a superfluous complement to the last two words, exire noluit—i.e. ‘so as not to set out for there
[...] he refused to depart.’ I believe that originally the first three words formed a marginal gloss and that, later, they
were transferred to the text. In the translation I have retained only ‘for there.’ As for style, each of the Latin
sentence’s remaining three clauses contains a different form of exire = ‘to go out.’
scarcely believe that he was one of those men reclining then. 4 When they offered him in the pharaoh’s name what they had brought, he accepted only some veal and other such food that the immediate circumstances called for; he distributed the ointments, garlands, and desserts among his slaves and ordered the remaining gifts to be returned. 5 Consequently, the foreigners looked down on him even more, as they supposed that his selection of those trivial things was chiefly due to ignorance of what is good.

6 While he was returning from Egypt with two hundred twenty talents that Pharaoh Nectanabis II had given him to offer as a present to his country, he entered the harbor called Menelaus’ Port, which lies between Cyrene and Egypt. Taken ill there, he died. 7 So that they could convey his corpse more readily all the way to Sparta, his friends then covered it with melted wax, since they had no honey, and they bore it back home in that manner.
Eumenes of Cardia. Had this man been granted good fortune on a par with his moral perfection, he would have been much more famous and still more honored, but not greater at any rate, since we judge men great based on their virtue, not their luck. Now, the fact that he happened to live among the Macedonians during the period when they prevailed was quite a disadvantage for him since he came from a foreign state; and he lacked nothing but a noble Macedonian pedigree. Even though he came from one of the very best families in his own country, nevertheless the Macedonians resented it when at times he was preferred to them, but they allowed it all the same: in truth he surpassed them all with respect to diligence, circumspection, endurance, skill, and quick wits.

As a very young man he befriended Philippus II of Macedonia, Amyntas’ son, and in a short time he attained to an intimate association: indeed, a virtuous disposition was already conspicuous in the youth. And so Philippus kept him at his side as his secretary, a position much more highly esteemed among the Greeks than the Romans: we consider secretaries paid servants, just as they are in reality; but among the Greeks, on the contrary, only someone of honorable family and, moreover, acknowledged loyalty and assiduity is admitted to that function, since of necessity he takes part in all deliberations. He occupied this position of intimacy with Philippus for seven years. After Philippus’ assassination he had the same status with Alexander III the Great for thirteen years, during the final part of which he also commanded the ‘Hetaerice,’ or The Comrades, one of the two cavalry corps. He always participated in the council of both kings, and he was treated as a partner in all matters.

After Alexander’s death in Babylon, his close companions divided his provinces among themselves singly, and guardianship of supreme power went to Perdicas, to whom the dying Alexander had given his ring. Everyone surmised that he had thereby entrusted his kingdom to him until his own progeny came of age: in fact Crateros and Antipater, who appeared to have precedence over him, were absent, and Hephaestio, the man of whom Alexander obviously thought the most highly, was dead. At that time Eumenes received Cappadocia, that is, nominally, for it lay in enemy hands then. Perdicas had taken great pains to get him as an ally, since he found him to be a most loyal and assiduous man, nor did he doubt that if he won him over, he would prove very useful to him in the operations that he was preparing. He was planning, of course, what nearly all in great empires strive after: to snatch up everyone else’s shares and gather them together. Nor in truth was he alone in doing so, but all the others who had been Alexander’s companions did, too. The first was Leonnatus, who decided to occupy Macedonia before anyone else. By means of many grand promises he strove to persuade Eumenes to abandon Perdicas and form an alliance with himself. Unable to convince him, he was ready to slay him, and he would have done so if Eumenes had not escaped from his camp under the cover of night.

Meanwhile, internecine wars broke out, those waged after Alexander’s death, and all united to overthrow Perdicas. Even though Eumenes saw that Perdicas’ position was weak, since he had to stand up alone against all the others, he did not, however, abandon his friend, nor was he inclined to place his own safety before his loyalty. Perdicas had given him authority

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70 A city in the Thracian Chersonese.
71 336.
72 323.
over the region of Asia lying between the Taurus Range and the Hellespont, and he had placed him single-handed in opposition to the European adversaries; Perdiccas, for his part, had departed for Egypt to wage war on Ptolemaeus. While Eumenes’ troops were neither numerous nor proven, as they were untrained and had been gathered only recently, on the other hand Antipater and Crateros, men superior both by reason of their renown and experience in warfare, were said to be on the way after having crossed the Hellespont with a large army of Macedonians, warriors who indeed enjoyed the reputation then that Roman soldiers have today: the fact is that men who come by the greatest empire have always been considered the most valiant. Eumenes recognized that if his troops learned against whom he was leading them, not only would they refuse to proceed, but they would disperse as soon as they received the news.

Thus it seemed to him most prudent to lead his soldiers along out-of-the-way routes where they could not learn the truth and to convince them that they were setting out against some barbarians. And so he held to this resolution, and he had his army form its battle line and engage in combat before his soldiers knew against whom they were fighting. Further, by occupying certain sites beforehand he brought it about that he fought using his cavalry, where his strength lay, rather than his infantry, in which he was weaker.

In a very fierce encounter that went on for a large part of the day, the general Crateros and Neoptolemus, second ranking in command, fell. Eumenes himself clashed with the latter. When they had clenched each other and had fallen to the ground from their horses, one could readily discern that they were grappling through personal enmity and were fighting even more by dint of their passions than their bodies; they were not separated before one of them perished. Although Eumenes received several wounds at his hands, he did not retire from the battle on that account but pursued his foes even more ardently. At this point, after the defeat of their cavalry, the death of their general Crateros, and, moreover, the capture of many top-ranking officers, the infantrymen, who had been diverted to a position from which they could not escape unless Eumenes allowed it, sought to make peace with him. Having procured it, they did not keep their word, and as soon as they could, they joined Antipater’s ranks. Eumenes took pains, but in vain, to revive Crateros, who had been carried half-dead from the battlefield; by reason of the man’s distinction and their former friendship (Crateros had been his companion in Alexander’s time), he provided imposing obsequies and sent his bones back to his wife and children in Macedonia.

While all this was going on in the region of the Hellespont, Seleucus and Antigones slew Perdiccas near the Nile, and Antipater obtained supreme power. The army voted to condemn to death in their absence those who had turned their backs on Antipater—Eumenes was among them. Although shaken by that blow, he did not give up, and he none the less attended to the war. But in any event his meager resources limited his loftiness of spirit, even if they did not topple it. While pursuing him, Antigonus, although he had abundant troops of every sort, was frequently harassed on the march, nor did he ever manage to engage him in combat except in places where a few could stand their ground against many. Yet in the end, even though Eumenes could not be defeated by maneuvering, the multitude surrounded him. Having lost many of his men as a consequence, he escaped nevertheless and took refuge in a Phrygian stronghold named Nora. While blockaded there he feared that by remaining in a single spot he would lose the use of his military horses since they lacked space to exercise; he hit upon an ingenuous method for warming up and drilling a horse in place so that it ate with a better appetite and, at the same time, did not want for physical movement. He restrained the horse’s head with a leather strap placed high
enough so that its front hooves barely touched the ground; then, with a whip it was made to jump up and kick out its hind hooves: the movement produced no less sweat than if the horse had run on a race-track. 6 Consequently, all marveled that after having spent several months blockaded, he led out of the stronghold horses just as fatted as if he had kept them in grasslands. 7 While blockaded, as often as he wished he sometimes burned Antigonus’ war machines and siege works or at others tore them to pieces. He remained, however, in the same place till winter’s end, since he could not encamp under the open sky. Springtime was nigh: feigning surrender he fooled Antigonus’ officers while he was discussing terms, and he extricated himself and all his men unscathed.

6 When Olympias, Alexander’s mother, had sent a letter and messengers to him in Asia to advise her whether she should go to Macedonia (for at the time she was living in Epirus) to claim the throne and seize power, 2 he urged her above all not to move and to wait until Alexander’s son obtained the throne; but if some motive caused her to hasten to Macedonia, she ought to disregard all past affronts and exert her authority over no one too harshly. 3 She followed none of his advice: she departed for Macedonia and behaved very cruelly there. And then she entreated the distant Eumenes to keep those most inimical to Philippus’ dynasty and family from doing away with his descendants as well and to help Alexander’s progeny. 4 Were he to grant her request, he should gather as soon as possible armies that he would bring to support her. In order for him to do so more easily, she had sent letters to all the governors who remained loyal and told them to obey him and heed his decisions. 5 Eumenes, deeply moved because of this, thought it preferable, if such were his fortune, to perish showing gratitude for the kindness of Philippus’ family towards him than to live as an ingrate.

7 Accordingly, he gathered troops and made ready to wage war on Antigonus. Since many Macedonian nobles were in his company, and among them Peucestes, who had served as Alexander’s bodyguard and, later, came by Persia, and Antigones, who commanded the phalanx of Macedonians, Eumenes feared resentment (which, however, he could not avoid) if he, a foreigner, acquired supreme command rather than one of the numerous Macedonians present. 2 And so, at the military headquarters he set up a tent in Alexander’s name wherein he ordered a golden chair to be placed along with a scepter and diadem, and he directed all to assemble there daily to deliberate on the most important business: he believed that he would provoke less envy if he seemed to manage the war with the outward appearance of Alexander’s authority and ostensibly in his name. He accomplished this. 3 For since meetings were held not in Eumenes’ headquarters but in the king’s and deliberation on matters took place there, he drew attention away from himself to some extent while, nevertheless, he alone controlled everything.

8 He clashed with Antigonus, not in battle array but on the march, in the region of Persia inhabited by the Paraetaceni, and having given him a rude welcome, he made him return to Media for the winter. 73 Eumenes distributed his troops in winter quarters in a neighboring area of Persia not according to what he wanted but what his soldiers’ will imposed on him. 2 For that famed phalanx of Alexander the Great which had traversed all of Asia and conquered the Persians had grown inveterate with respect not only to glory but also unruliness, and instead of obeying its leaders it claimed the right to give them orders, as our own veterans now do. And thus there is the risk that our veterans, through their excesses and extreme lawlessness, will do what Eumenes’ did and will lose everything, and not less the men with whom they have held their ground than those

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73 319.
74 317.
against whom they have fought, because if one were to read about the acts of those past veterans, he would recognize that ours act similarly, and he would conclude that nothing is different except the period. But I shall return to Eumenes’ soldiers. They had chosen winter quarters not by reason of military advantage but their own self-indulgent living, and they had dispersed themselves far from one another. When Antigonus found out, aware that he would not be a match for these adversaries were they in readiness, he decided to adopt some new stratagem. Two roads led from Media, where he was wintering, to the enemy’s winter lodgings. The shorter of the two passed through a desert that no one inhabited because water was scarce; moreover, it took about ten days to cover it. The other, however, by which everyone traveled, was a roundabout road twice as long, but it was amply supplied and abounded in all essentials. If he traveled by the latter, he knew that his adversaries would find out about his approach before he had completed a third of the journey; but if he marched quickly through the desert, he hoped to overwhelm an unsuspecting enemy. To accomplish this he ordered as many water-skins as possible and leather sacks, also, to be collected, then fodder as well as food for ten days, in particular cooked rations, so that there would be the bare minimum of fires in camp. He hid from all the route that he had in mind. Thus prepared, he set out by the road that he had chosen.

He had completed nearly half the distance when because of smoke from his camp Eumenes gathered that his foes were approaching. The leaders convened. They considered what measures to take. They all realized that they could not assemble their troops by the time that Antigonus seemed likely to arrive. While everyone was faltering and they abandoned all hope, Eumenes said that if they were willing to hasten and follow orders, which they had not done previously, he would set things right. For seeing that their foes could complete their march in five days, he would cause them to be delayed further by at least as many days: therefore those present should go about, and each should muster his own troops. So then, he formed the following stratagem to curb Antigonus’ onrush. He sent trusted men to the foot of the mountains on his adversaries’ route, and he instructed them to light the largest fires they could at nightfall along the most extensive breadth possible, to reduce them at the second watch, and at the third to keep them all but extinguished; thereby having simulated the practices of a military camp, they would make the enemy suppose that they were bivouacked in this location and that Antigonus’ arrival had been reported beforehand; and they were to do the same the following night. The men who had received the orders attended carefully to his instructions. At nightfall Antigonus caught sight of the fires: he believed that his adversaries had learned of his approach and had assembled their troops there. He altered his plan, and since he could not attack them off their guard, he changed the direction of his march and took that roundabout way of the longer, well-supplied road, and he waited for one day there to relieve his soldiers’ fatigue and reinvigorate his horses in order to fight with a fresher army.

Thus by means of his stratagem Eumenes got the better of a shrewd general and made him slow down, but it was not, however, of much benefit to him. For owing to the jealousy of the generals who accompanied him and the Macedonian veterans’ perfidy, after he had triumphed in the subsequent battle, he was handed over to Antigonus even though the army had previously sworn on three different occasions to defend him and never forsake him. But some held virtue so cheap that they preferred to break their word rather than not destroy him. Still, Antigonus, who had been his worst enemy, would have spared him had his men allowed it, since he recognized that no one could help him more in the crucial situations that, as was already clear to all, loomed ahead. In fact, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Ptolemaeus, with whom he would have to contend for
supremacy, were an immediate threat, and they were already strong with regard to military resources. But those around him would not put up with it, for they saw that if Eumenes were admitted among them, they all would be insignificant compared with that great man. On the other hand, Antigonus himself was so enraged that only the bright prospect of unparalleled benefits could appease him.

Therefore, when he had Eumenes taken into custody and the supervisor of the guards asked how he wanted him to be watched over, he replied: “Like a very fierce lion or a most ferocious elephant.” Actually, he still had to decide whether or not to spare his life. Now, two sorts of men went to Eumenes, some who on account of hatred wanted to take pleasure in the sight of his downfall and others who owing to friendship of long date wished to converse with him and console him; many, too, desired to inquire into his nature and find out what kind of man this person was whom they had feared for such a long time and so intensely and in whose destruction they had believed hope of their own victory lay. But Eumenes, after having spent some time in confinement, told Onomarchus, the superintendent of the guards, that it surprised him why he was being held in this way for what was by then three days; it was inconsistent with Antigonus’ good sense to mistreat a defeated man in like manner: why not order either his execution or his release? Onomarchus, to whom it seemed that he was speaking quite arrogantly, said: “Indeed? if that is what you thought, why did you not die fighting instead of falling into your enemy’s hands?” To which Eumenes replied: “Would that in fact what you say had happened! But it did not since by no means did I meet with a man stronger than myself: for I bore arms against no one who did not succumb to me. Doubtless I fell not due to my foes’ valor but my friends’ treachery.” Nor was it untrue….

Since Antigonus did not dare to decide the matter alone, he referred it to his council. There all the anxious advisers were surprised, in the first place, that he had not already executed the man who had ill-treated them to such an extent for so many years that they were often driven to despair and who had slain their foremost generals; and then, this single man was so great a threat that as long as he lived, they could not be free from danger, and if he were slain, all their troubles would be over; finally, if Antigonus liberated him, they asked, whose friendship would he enjoy? for they would certainly not remain in his company along with Eumenes. Having learned the will of his council, he none the less allowed himself six days to deliberate. But then, as he soon became afraid that the army might mutiny, he prohibited anyone from visiting Eumenes, and he ordered his daily provision of food to be stopped: for he said that he would not do violence to his former friend. In all events, after he had hungered for not more than three days, his guards murdered him, without Antigonus’ knowledge, while the army was breaking camp.

So it was that Eumenes, who from his twentieth year had served as Philippus’ secretary for seven years, as we noted earlier, and had maintained the same position with Alexander for thirteen, during which he had commanded a cavalry corps for one year; who after Alexander the Great’s death had led armies and defeated some of the best generals and slain others; and who following his capture not due to Antigonus’ valor but on account of the Macedonians’ breach of oath, met at the age of forty-five his end in the manner just described. It is very easy to judge

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75 There is a lacuna in the manuscripts here.
how highly all those who were called kings after Alexander the Great thought of him, since none of them went by the title of king, but rather governor, as long as Eumenes lived; 3 subsequent to Eumenes’ death, the same men promptly adopted royal pomp and assumed the title, nor were they willing to do what they had proclaimed at the beginning—that is, to maintain the realm for Alexander’s progeny—and with its sole defender out of the way, they revealed what they had in mind. Antigonus, Ptolemaeus, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassandrus were chiefly responsible for this villainy. 4 None the less, Antigonus handed over Eumenes’ corpse to his relatives for interment. They provided a funeral befitting a soldier and man of note with the whole army in attendance, and they saw to it that his bones were transported to his mother as well as his wife and children in Cappadocia.
Even though Phocion, an Athenian, often commanded the armies and assumed the highest magisterial offices, he is nevertheless much better known for the integrity of his life than for his military endeavors. Consequently, there is no recollection of the latter; on the other hand, he has earned widespread repute for the former, owing to which he received the agname ‘The Good.’

His means were modest all his life whereas he could have been very rich due to the numerous offices conferred on him and the positions of great power that the people granted him. When he refused a large sum of money as a gift from King Philippus II, the emissaries urged him to accept it and suggested likewise that even if he himself would get along easily without it, he might none the less provide for his children, who would find it difficult, with meager resources, to maintain their father’s extraordinary reputation. He answered them: “If my children become like me, the same little field that has permitted me to arrive at this distinction will sustain them; but if they are going to turn out otherwise, I refuse to maintain and promote their extravagance at my expense.”

After Fortune had favored him up to about the age of eighty, near the end of his life this same man became the object of his fellow citizens’ intense hatred, first because he had concurred with Demades to hand over the city to Antipater and on his recommendation Demosthenes and the others considered to have served the state well had been banished by the people’s decree. Nor in this did he err solely in looking after his homeland poorly but, also, in not maintaining loyalty in friendship. For promoted and aided by Demosthenes, he rose to the position that he held because he had the orator on his side against his opponent Chares; defended by the same friend several times in the courts on capital charges, he was acquitted. Phocion failed not only to defend him when he was in peril, he even betrayed him. Nevertheless, his downfall was due chiefly to one charge, because while the foremost office granted by the people, that of strategus, was in his keeping, Dercylus warned him that Nicanor, Cassandrus’ prefect, was plotting to seize the Piraeus, without which Athens simply cannot exist, and he entreated him to make preparations so that the city would not be deprived of provisions. With the people listening, Phocion told him that there was no danger, and he promised that he himself would serve as surety of this. Soon afterwards Nicanor took possession of the Piraeus. When armed citizens rushed together in order to recover it, neither did Phocion call for anyone to take up arms, nor was he willing to assume command of those already armed.

There were two factions in Athens then: one supported the people’s cause and the other, that of the aristocrats. Phocion and Demetrius of Phalerum belonged to the latter group. Both factions benefited from the Macedonians’ patronage: the popular party favored Polyaereon, and the aristocrats shared Cassandrus’ views. During this time Polyperchon drove Cassandrus out of Macedonia. As a result the people prevailed, and immediately they condemned on capital charges and drove out the leaders of the opposing faction, among whom were Phocion and Demetrius of Phalerum, and they sent emissaries to Polyaereon concerning the matter to ask him to confirm their decrees. Phocion set out for the same place. When he arrived there, he was ordered to

76 Cf. Plutarch’s biography of Phocion, §§ 18 and 30, concerning monetary gifts from Alexander the Great and Menyllos.
77 322.
78 *Amicitia.* Notwithstanding, Demosthenes and Phocion held opposing views on Athenian policy with regard to the Macedonians.
plead his case ostensibly before King Philippus III Arhidaeus, but in reality, at any rate, it would go before Polyperchon, who was in charge of the king’s business at that time. 4 After Agnon had accused him of treason for giving the Piraeus over to Nicanor, Phocion was imprisoned by the decision of the council and, then, was escorted to Athens for trial in accordance with that city’s laws.

4 When he arrived there transported in a cart since he could not walk by then due to age, large crowds gathered. While some, recalling his fame of former days, pitied him because he was old, the majority, however, burned with anger inasmuch as they suspected him of treason in the matter of the Piraeus and, most of all, because he had taken sides against the people’s interests in his declining years. 2 Therefore, he was not even given the chance to speak in his defense and plead his case. 79 Then, after certain legal formalities had been carried out, the court pronounced him guilty and delivered him to the eleven-man board to which, in keeping with Athenian custom, those officially condemned are usually handed over for execution. 3 Euphiletus, whose friendship he had enjoyed, encountered him as he was being led to his death; weeping he said: “Oh! how undeserved is the mistreatment you endure, Phocion!” “But it is not surprising,” he replied, “for a good many renowned Athenian men have met the same end.” 4 The common people hated him so much that no freeman dared to bury him. And so, he was interred by slaves.

79 Perhaps both terms for pleading his case have the same meaning, and one (dicendi causam) is a gloss of the other (perorandi).
XX. TIMOLEON

1 Timoleon, a Corinthian. In the judgment of all, unquestionably this man is manifestly great. For he was so singularly fortunate, perhaps more than any other, that he liberated his native land from a despot’s oppression, and, further, he freed the Syracusans, to whom he had been sent in order to lend aid, from their long-standing servitude, and owing to his arrival, he restored all of Sicily, which for many years had been troubled by war and subjugated by foreigners, to its former condition. 2 But in these exploits he contended with Fortune’s ups and downs, and a thing deemed still more difficult, he dealt with his good luck much more wisely than his misfortune. 3 When his brother Timophanes, whom the Corinthians had chosen as general, seized tyrannical power by means of mercenaries, and Timoleon could have shared in the rule, he kept so aloof from complicity in the misdeed that he preferred his compatriots’ freedom to his brother’s life, and he thought it better to be subject to the laws of his country than to rule it. 4 With this in mind he saw to it that the tyrant, his brother, was slain at the hands of a soothsayer and a common relative, the husband of their sister born to the same parents. He himself did not lay hands on his brother, and he was not even willing to see his blood shed. For while the business was being carried out, he kept watch at a distance to prevent any guard from hastening to his brother’s aid. 5 Not all valued this most splendid deed of his in like manner: some in fact judged that he had failed in his fraternal duty, and owing to ill-will they treated the praise of his courage with disdain. Even his mother never admitted her son into her house afterwards, nor did she catch sight of him without rebuking him as a fratricide and cursing him for his impiety. 6 These circumstances troubled him to such a degree that at times he wanted to end his life and withdraw from ungrateful men’s sight through his death.

2 Meanwhile, after Dion’s assassination in Syracuse, Dionysius the Younger became master of the city again. His adversaries sought from the Corinthians aid and a commander to lead the war. Having been sent for this purpose, Timoleon, with amazing luck, overcame Dionysius in all of Sicily. 2 Even though he could have slain him, he declined to do so, and he brought it about that he arrived safely in Corinth, for since both tyrants named Dionysius had often helped the Corinthians with their resources, he wanted the recollection of their beneficence to stand out, and he thought that in an outstanding triumph more clemency than cruelty was present; ultimately, he wanted his people not only to hear but see with their own eyes, besides, what kind of man he had brought down from so mighty a rule to such a lowly lot. 3 After Dionysius’ departure, Timoleon waged war on Hicetas, who had opposed Dionysius: his opposition was not due to hatred of despotism but served as an indication of his ambition, since following the despot’s expulsion he refused to concede supremacy. 4 After having defeated him, Timoleon put to flight an enormous Carthaginian army near the Crinissus River, and he made those who for a good many years already had retained possession of Sicily think it enough that they were allowed to keep their realm in Africa. Moreover, he captured an Italian general, Mamercus, a bellicose, powerful man who had gone to Sicily to aid the tyrants.

3 Having accomplished all this, he saw that because of the long duration of warfare not just the rural areas but the cities, too, were abandoned, and he gathered, first, what Sicilians he

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80 365.
81 346.
82 344.
83 339; also called Crimisos.
could *and*, then, sent for settlers from Corinth, since originally *Corinthians* had founded Syracuse. 2 To the citizens of long standing he returned *their* property, he distributed among the newcomers landed properties vacated due to the hostilities, he repaired the cities’ walls that had been scattered and deserted temples, *and* he restored to the communities *their* laws and liberty: immediately after a tremendous war he secured so much peace throughout the island that he was looked upon as *its* cities’ founder, not the men who had led *settlers there* in the beginning. 3 He tore down from top to bottom Syracuse’s citadel that Dionysius had fortified to intimidate the city; he pulled down the other bastions of despotism and took pains to *ensure* that as few vestiges of servitude as possible remained. 4 Although he was so mighty that he could have ruled even against *his people’s* will, *and* all the Sicilians loved him so much that he could have retained supremacy with no one raising an objection, he preferred to be esteemed rather than feared. And so, as soon as he could, he relinquished mastery and spent the rest of *his* life as a private citizen in Syracuse. 5 Nor in truth did he do so ineptly: for what others have been capable of as kings owing to *their* authority, he attained through goodwill. No public office was *denied* him, and afterwards no business requiring a vote was acted upon in Syracuse in the state’s name before Timoleon’s opinion was known. 6 Not only did *his* advice always prevail, but no one else’s was even considered on the same footing. Nor did this occur more on account of goodwill than good judgment.

4 When he was already advanced in age, he lost his eyesight in the absence of any illness. He bore this misfortune with such self-restraint that no one heard him complain, nor did he attend *any* less to private and public affairs on account of it. 2 So, he went to the theater when the popular assembly was held there; because of frailty he was conveyed by a *pair of mules*, and thus from *his* cart he voiced *his* opinion. And no one attributed this to arrogance, since he never uttered either an insolent or boastful word. 3 For example, whenever he heard someone sing his praises, he always said only that in this respect he especially thanked the gods and felt most grateful to them both for having decided to revive Sicily and for having preferred him to serve as commander in chief of the enterprise. 4 He thought that nothing in human affairs came about without the gods’ behest; accordingly he had set up in his home a shrine of Automatia, and he honored it very reverently.

5 In addition to this man’s surpassing goodness, we note the following remarkable incidents. In fact, all *his* most important battles *took place* on his birthday, which consequently became a holiday throughout Sicily. 2 When a certain Laphystius, an impudent ingrate, wanted to cite *him* to appear in court because, *as* he said, he was bringing a suit against him, a crowd gathered and attempted to curb *his* brashness by force, *but* Timoleon implored them all not to: for he had undertaken very considerable and perilous efforts so that it would be lawful for Laphystius and anyone at all to proceed thus; *his* notion of freedom was this: *absolutely* everyone would be permitted to exercise *his* legal rights in seeking what he wanted. 3 Likewise, when in the people’s assembly someone similar to Laphystius by the name of Demaenetus had set about belittling Timoleon’s exploits and railed against *him*, *the latter* said that now at last his prayer was answered, for he had always begged the immortal gods that he might restore to the Sicilians the sort of freedom permitting anyone at all to say whatever he wished about whatever he wished with impunity.

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84 Probably in 337.
85 The goddess Fortune.
86 In Timoleonta, with Greek accusative singular.
4 When he passed away, the Syracusans interred him at public expense in the gymnasium named after him with a great throng from all of Sicily in attendance.
XXI. CONCERNING KINGS

1 These were nearly all the generals of the Greek people thought worthy of recollection, apart from the kings, a subject that I have not wanted to take up before now since I related the accomplishments of them all separately. Still, they are far from numerous. 2 As for the Lacedaemonian Agesilaus, like the other rulers of Sparta he held the title of king, but not sovereign authority. Of the kings who actually enjoyed sovereign power along with the status, the most distinguished among the Persians were, in our judgment, Cyrus II the Great and Darius I, son of Hystaspes, both of whom as private citizens obtained supreme authority through their valor. The former fell in battle among the Scythian Massagetae, and Darius died of old age. 3 In addition, there are three others of the same nation: Xerxes I and two named Artaxerxes, the first with the agname Macrochir and the second, Mnemon. Xerxes is especially illustrious since he warred on land and at sea against Greece with the largest fighting force in man’s memory. 4 But Macrochir won praise particularly for his very imposing and handsome physique together with an amazing valor in warfare: the fact is that no Persian was braver than he in combat. Mnemon, on the other hand, earned distinction due to his reputation for rectitude. For having lost his wife on account of a wicked deed committed by his mother, he yielded to his resentment only in so far as filial piety allowed him. 5 Of the three, the two with the same name paid their debt to nature through sickness, and the blade of his prefect Artabanus cut short the life of the third.

2 Among the Macedonians two surpass by far the rest with regard to the glory of their exploits: Philippus II, Amyntas’ son, and Alexander III the Great. The second of them succumbed to illness in Babylon, and at Aegae, where he went to watch the entertainment, Philippus was murdered by Pausanias near the theater. 2 Pyrrhus, who waged war on the Romans, is the only Epirote worth noting. While attacking the town of Argos in the Peloponnesus, he was struck by a stone, and he died. Likewise, a single Sicilian, Dionysius the Elder, stands out. He was both brave in combat and skilled in warfare, and something infrequently found in a despot, he was not in the least licentious, not extravagant, not covetous; he desired nothing, in short, except to rule alone permanently, and for this reason he was cruel: during the time that he sought to protect his rule, he spared the life of no one whom he thought to be plotting against it. 3 Although he had acquired tyrannical power for himself through his valor, he preserved it through a good deal of luck: in fact he died at over sixty years of age while his reign was prospering. Nor in his long life did he attend a funeral of any of his descendants, even though three wives had borne him children and he had many grandchildren.

3 Moreover, there were mighty kings among Alexander the Great’s associates who acquired their realms after his demise; they include Antigonus and his son Demetrius, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemaeus. 2 From among them, Antigonus was slain in battle while fighting against Seleucus and Lysimachus, and Lysimachus suffered a comparable end at the

87 In On Distinguished Kings of Foreign Nations, a lost book of Lives of Distinguished Men. Nepos names here fourteen foreign kings, in both title and authority: five Persians, an Epirote, a Sicilian tyrant, and seven Macedonians. Because of the reference limited to Greeks in this sentence, scholars have inferred that Nepos published a first version of the present book dealing solely with Greek generals and that he added later, in a second edition, this chapter and the lives of Datames, Hamilcar, and Hannibal.

88 Long Hand.

89 Having a Good Memory.
hands of Seleucus, since when their alliance ended, they waged war with each other. 3 As for Demetrius, he had given his daughter in marriage to Seleucus, but all the same, it was impossible for a reliable alliance to endure between them, and after the father-in-law had been captured in war, he died of sickness in his son-in-law’s prison. 4 And not much later Seleucus was slain treacherously by Ptolemaeus Ceraunus, whom the former had harbored when he was in need of others’ help after his banishment from Alexandria by order of his father Ptolemaeus. While living Ptolemaeus himself turned over kingship to another son, Ptolemaeus II, who, some say, then did away with him.

5 Now that I believe to have written enough concerning these kings, it seems opportune to deal with Hamilcar and Hannibal, acknowledged as foremost among all the natives of Africa with respect to loftiness of soul and ingenuity.

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90 Thunderbolt.
XXII. HAMILCAR

1 The Carthaginian Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, or Thunderbolt, son of Hannibal, as a young man began his career commanding an army in Sicily near the end of the First Punic War. 2 Although before his arrival the Carthaginians suffered setbacks both at sea and on land, whenever he took part in combat he never yielded to the enemy or gave them the occasion to do harm; on the contrary, he frequently seized the opportunity to challenge them and always withdrew from the fight victorious. Therefore, while the Carthaginians had lost nearly everything in Sicily, he defended Eryx so well that it might seem as if no war had been waged there. 3 Meantime, after the Roman consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus had defeated their fleet near the Aegates Islands, the Carthaginians decided to put an end to the war, and they entrusted the matter to Hamilcar’s direction. Even though he was burning with a desire to fight on, he none the less thought that he should serve the cause of peace, since he recognized that his homeland, spent due to wartime expenses, could no longer bear the misfortunes of war; but he immediately began turning over in his mind the idea that if only the situation might be redressed somewhat, the Carthaginians would go to war again and seek vengeance on the Romans with arms until either they prevailed owing to their valor or, vanquished, they surrendered. 5 While negotiating peace in keeping with this intention, he displayed pride so noble that when Catulus refused to end the war unless he and his men who had control of Eryx laid down their arms and left Sicily, Hamilcar declared that with his native country capitulating thus, he would rather perish than return home covered with shame: for his courage was not such that he would hand over to adversaries weapons which he had received from his country to oppose them. Catulus yielded to his determination.

2 But upon his return to Carthage, he found the affairs of state quite different from what he had hoped. Such great internal warfare flared up due to the perennial adversities abroad that never was Carthage in graver peril except when it was destroyed. 2 In the first place, twenty thousand mercenary soldiers engaged to oppose the Romans revolted. They turned all of Africa against Carthage and attacked the city itself. 3 The Carthaginians were so terrified because of these calamities that they even sought auxiliary troops from the Romans, and they procured them. But at last, when they had already nearly reached the point of giving up hope, they appointed Hamilcar commander in chief. 4 Although the enemy numbered more than one hundred thousand armed men, he not only beat them back from Carthage’s walls, but he even drove them into a place where, hemmed in by a narrow pass, more died due to starvation than cold steel. He recovered for his homeland all the rebel fortified places, among them Utica and Hippo, the strongest in all Africa. 5 Nor was he satisfied on that account, but he extended the empire’s boundaries, too, and rendered the whole of Africa so peaceful that no war would seem to have taken place in it for many years.

3 Having accomplished all this as he wished, confident in spirit and antagonistic towards the Romans he succeeded in having himself sent to Spain as general of an army whereby he might more readily find an excuse to wage war, and he took his nine-year-old son Hannibal there

91 248.
92 See a similar declaration at the end of 2.5 infra. The warrior Hamilcar is portrayed as a peacemaker—cf. Epaminondas 5.4 and Timoleon 3.2.
93 Off the western coast of Sicily; 241.
94 238.
with him.\textsuperscript{2} He was accompanied, moreover, by an eminent, handsome young man, Hasdrubal, whom some \textit{rumored} that Hamilcar loved more basely than was fitting: the slanderers could indeed not fail \textit{to malign} so worthy a man. Consequently it happened that the \textit{official responsible} for overseeing morals forbade Hasdrubal to remain with him. \textit{Hamilcar} gave him his daughter in marriage, since in keeping with their customs a father-in-law could not be forbidden \textit{to associate} with \textit{his} son-in-law. \textit{3} We have mentioned this man because after Hamilcar’s demise, he commanded the army, and he performed notable exploits, and he was the first to subvert the Carthaginians’ ancient customs due to his distribution of largesse, and after his death, the army made Hannibal commander in chief.

\textit{4} As for Hamilcar, after his arrival in Spain by ship, favored by Fortune he accomplished momentous deeds: he subdued very mighty, warlike peoples, and he enriched all Africa with \textit{booty of horses, weapons, prisoners, and money}. \textit{2} While eight years after his arrival in Spain he was contemplating an attack on Italy, he was slain in battle fighting against the Vettons. \textit{3} His abiding hatred of the Romans seems particularly to have occasioned the Second Punic War. For surely Hannibal, his son, was won over so thoroughly through \textit{his} father’s persistent supplications that he would rather perish than not measure his strength with the Romans.

\textsuperscript{237.}
XXIII. HANNIBAL

1 Hannibal, Hamilcar’s son, a Carthaginian. If it is true, inasmuch as no one doubts it, that the Roman people have surpassed all others in valor, then undeniably Hannibal outdid the other generals in skill to the extent that Romans take the lead among all nations with regard to bravery. 2 For on every occasion that he took the field against them in Italy, he came off victorious. If, however, the malice of his compatriots at home had not undermined him, it seems that he could have subdued the Romans. But the jealousy of many of them got the better of this sole man’s valor.

3 Furthermore, his adherence to the animosity towards the Romans inherited, so to speak, from his father was such that he would sooner die than disclaim it; in fact, after he had been driven from his native land and was in need of others’ aid, he never ceased in his mind waging war on the Romans. 2 For example, if I may be allowed to pass over Philippus V of Macedonia, whom from a distance he turned against the Romans, Antiochus III the Great was the most powerful king of all at the time. He inflamed him with such a strong desire to fight that he undertook to advance against Italy all the way from the Red Sea. 2 When Roman envoys went to the king, they searched out his intentions and strove through clandestine measures to lead him to be suspicious of Hannibal, just as if he had accepted a bribe from them and changed his views, nor did they do so in vain. Hannibal found out and saw that he was excluded from the confidential council. 3 When the opportunity presented itself, he approached the king, and having reminded him of many examples of his trustworthiness and hatred of the Romans, he added this: “When I was a little boy not more than nine years old, my father Hamilcar, in the course of leaving Carthage for Spain as commander in chief, sacrificed victims to Most Great and Good Jupiter. 4 While the sacred ritual was being carried out, he asked me whether I would like to set out with him for the campaign. I consented gladly and set about begging him to take me without delay. He then said: ‘I shall do so if you give me your word to do what I request.’ At the same time he led me to the altar where he had undertaken the sacrifices, and having dismissed everyone, he ordered me, with my hand on it, to swear that I would never befriend the Romans. 5 Up to my present age I have maintained so faithfully the oath I made to my father that no one should suspect a change of mind on my part in the time remaining to me. 6 Accordingly, if you have something friendly in mind with regard to the Romans, you will be prudent to conceal it from me; but in any case, when you prepare for war against them, you will thwart yourself if you do not place me in charge of it.”

3 So then, at the age that I indicated he departed for Spain with his father, after whose death Hasdrubal was appointed to replace him as general, and Hannibal commanded the entire cavalry. When Hasdrubal was slain, too, the army conferred supreme command on him. 2 This was made known in Carthage, where it received official approval. 2 Thus Hannibal, not yet twenty-five years old, became general; in the following three years he conquered in battle all the peoples of Spain, he stormed Saguntum, a city allied with Rome, and he gathered three very large armies, one of which he sent to Africa, another he left with his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, and with the third under his command he marched towards Italy. He passed over the gorges of the Pyrenees. Wherever he went, he clashed with all the inhabitants: he left none behind

96 That is, from Syria. An exaggeration of the southern limits of Antiochus’ realm?
97 221.
98 219.
but the vanquished. 4 Afterwards he reached the Alps separating Italy from Gaul; no one before
him had ever crossed them with an army except the Greek Hercules (hence today the route is
called the Greek Pass); he slaughtered the Alpine natives who attempted to block his crossing, he
cleared the way, constructed roads, and brought it about that a fully loaded elephant could pass in
places where formerly a single unarmed man had hardly been able to crawl along. He led his
Troops across via this route and reached Italy.

4 He had clashed earlier with the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio at the Rhone River and
had driven him back. He contended with him again at Clastidium near the Po River and sent him
away from there wounded and in full flight. 2 A third time the same Scipio, along with his
coprincipal Tiberius Sempronius Longus, went to oppose him at the Trebia River. Hannibal
engaged in close combat with them and vanquished both. From there he crossed the Apennines
through the Ligurians’ territory as he headed for Etruria. 3 On this march he was afflicted with an
ocular malady so serious that later he never saw again with his right eye as well as before.
Although he was still burdened with that ailment and was carried in a litter, near Lake Trasimeno
he outwitted the consul Gaius Flaminius, whom he ambushed together with his army, and he slew
him. Not much later he dealt in the same manner with the praetor Gaius Centenius, who was
occupying a pass with an elite army. From there he reached Apulia, 4 where two consuls, Gaius
Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus, went to confront him. In a single battle he put
both their armies to flight, and he slew the consul Paulus as well as some ex-consuls, among
them Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, who had served as consul the previous year.

5 Following this battle he set out for Rome without meeting any resistance. He stayed in
the hills near the city. After he had camped for several days there and was returning to Capua,
Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, appointed Roman dictator, blocked his way in the Falernian
region. 2 Here, hemmed in by a narrow pass, Hannibal freed himself at night without losing any
of his army, and he fooled Fabius, a very shrewd commander. Under the cover of night he lit
twigs tied to the horns of young cattle, and he goaded on a very large number of beasts of this
sort to wander about. The Roman soldiers were so terrified by the sudden apparition before them
that none dared to go outside the stockade. 3 A few days after that exploit, by means of a ruse he
drew into battle Marcus Minucius Rufus, master of the horse with the same power as the dictator,
and he put him to flight. Although not present at the action, Hannibal drew Tiberius Sempronius
Gracchus, who had been consul twice, into an ambush in Lucania and did away with him. He
slew Marcus Claudius Marcellus, consul for the fifth time, in a similar fashion near Venusia.
4 It would be tedious to enumerate all his battles. Wherefore the following statement alone will
suffice to indicate how mighty he was: as long as he remained in Italy, no one stood his ground
against him in battle array, no one pitched camp facing him on the open plain after the encounter
at Cannae.

6 Undefeated, he was called back from here to defend his homeland, where he fought
against Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder, son of the man whom he had first put to
flight at the Rhone, again near the Po, and the third time at the Trebia River. 2 As his country’s
resources were depleted by then, Hannibal wanted to arrange with him an armistice for the time

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99 218.
100 217.
101 At Cannae in 216.
102 212.
103 208.
being so as to regain strength for fighting later. He parleyed with Scipio, but they did not come to terms.  

3 A few days after their meeting he clashed with Scipio at Zama; driven back, in two days and nights he reached Hadrumetum, some three hundred Roman miles from Zama.  

4 During the retreat the Numidians who had withdrawn from battle along with him lay in ambush for him; he not only evaded them, but he subdued them besides. He assembled at Hadrumetum those remaining after the retreat, and he gathered many more troops in a few days through new recruitment.  

7 While he was engaged most zealously in preparing for war, the Carthaginians concluded peace with the Romans. He remained none the less in command of the army thereafter, and he and also his brother Mago waged war in Africa until the consulship of Publius Sulpicius and Gaius Aurelius Cotta.  

2 During their term of office Carthaginian ambassadors went to Rome; they thanked the Roman senate and people for having brought about a reconciliation with them, on account of which they offered them a golden crown, and at the same time they entreated them to let their hostages stay at Fregellae and to return their prisoners.  

3 The following reply was made to them in conformity with the senate’s resolution: their gift was received gratefully; the hostages would live in the place that they requested; but the prisoners would not be released since Hannibal, the Romans’ worst enemy due to whose aggression they had undertaken the Second Punic War, still commanded the army along with his brother Mago.  

4 Having received this response, the Carthaginians called Hannibal and Mago back home. When Hannibal returned there, he was made a king after having been commander for twenty-one years: as with consuls at Rome, at Carthage kings were elected two at a time annually for a one-year term.  

5 In that magisterial office Hannibal proved to be as industrious as he had been in wartime, for he saw to it that there was not just money from new taxes to pay out to the Romans in accordance with the peace treaty, but a surplus remained besides, and it was kept in the treasury.  

6 Then, in the year after his term of office during the consulship of Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Lucius Furius, envoys from Rome went to Carthage. Supposing that they had come to demand his surrender, Hannibal boarded a ship secretly before the senate heard them, and he fled to Antiochus III in Syria for refuge.  

7 Once this came to light, the Carthaginians sent two ships to apprehend him if they could catch up with him; they confiscated his possessions, razed his house, and declared him a proscript.  

8 But in the third year after Hannibal had fled from his home, during the consulship of Lucius Cornelius Merula and Quintus Minucius, he landed in Africa with five ships, in the region of Cyrene, on the chance that he might be able to persuade the Carthaginians to wage war owing to the hope and confidence occasioned by the example of Antiochus, whom he had already convinced to set out with armies for Italy.  

2 He summoned his brother Mago for this purpose. When the Carthaginians found out, they punished Mago in his absence just as they had his brother. Given their hopeless situation, the two weighed anchor and set sail, and Hannibal reached Antiochus. Two accounts of Mago’s death have been handed down: some have written that he perished in a shipwreck, others, that his own slaves slew him.  

3 And with respect to

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104 An example of word-play: ... bellum componere, quo valentior postea congrederetur. In colloquium convenit, condiciones non convenerunt.  

105 202.  

106 200.  

107 Rex. The office was that of suffete, one of the two supreme magistrates in Carthage.  

108 Consuls in 196. Hannibal, suffete in 196, went into exile in 195.
Antiochus, had he wished to follow Hannibal’s advice in conducting the war as closely as in deciding to embark on it, he would have fought for dominion over all nearer to the Tiber than at Thermopylae. Even though Hannibal saw him attempt many things imprudently, all the same he did not abandon him in any situation. 4 Once he commanded a small number of ships that he had been directed to conduct from Syria to Asia Minor, and with them he fought against the Rhodian fleet off the coast of Pamphylia. His men were overpowered there by the large number of adversaries, but on the wing in which he fought, he prevailed.

9 After Antiochus had been put to flight, Hannibal, fearing that he would be handed over to the enemy (which doubtless would have occurred had he provided the opportunity), went to Gortyn in Crete in order to consider there where he might take refuge. 2 This man surpassing all others in shrewdness saw, however, that because of the Cretans’ greed he would be in grave danger unless he did something to guard against it, since it was no secret, as he was aware, that he was carrying a great deal of money with him. And so he contrived the following ruse. 3 He filled several amphoras with lead and covered the top of them with gold and silver. With the leading citizens present he deposited them in the temple of Diana under the pretense of entrusting his fortune to their good faith. Having deceived them, he put all the rest of his money into bronze statues that he was transporting with him, and he left them lying unprotected in the courtyard of his residence. 4 The Gortynians kept a close eye on the temple, not so much on account of others as of Hannibal, lest unbeknownst to them he remove the amphoras and carry them away with him.

10 Having saved his possessions and fooled all the Cretans in this manner, the Carthaginian went to Prusias I in the Pontus. In his presence he maintained his hostile attitude towards Italy, and it turned his attention wholly to rousing the king to arms and setting him against the Romans. 2 When he saw that Prusias’ domestic resources were not substantial, he won over for him as allies the other kings near by and got warlike peoples to join forces with him. King Eumenes II of Pergamum, a faithful ally of Rome, was at odds with Prusias, and they waged war with each other at sea and on land. 3 But in both arenas Eumenes was stronger because of his alliance with the Romans, for which reason Hannibal wanted all the more for him to be crushed: if he were to eliminate him, he thought that the remaining undertakings would be easier to accomplish. He devised the following scheme for doing away with him. 4 In a few days they were going to fight it out at sea. The large number of enemy vessels put Hannibal at a disadvantage: he had to fight by means of cunning inasmuch as he was overmatched with regard to armed force. He ordered as many live poisonous snakes as possible to be gathered and put into earthen pots. 5 After having procured a very large number of snakes, on the very day he was to engage in the naval battle he assembled the marines and instructed them all to converge on King Eumenes’ ship alone. As for the other ships, it sufficed just to defend themselves against them, which they would achieve easily with the large supply of serpents. 6 On the other hand, he would see that they knew which vessel was the king’s; he promised them a generous reward if they either captured or slew him. 11 After he had heartened his soldiers in that manner, the fleets on both sides were drawn up for battle. When their battle lines had been formed but before the signal to commence fighting was given, Hannibal, so as to disclose Eumenes’ location to his men, sent a messenger in a skiff with a caduceus. 2 When he arrived at the enemy’s vessels, held out a letter, and announced that he was looking for the king, he was escorted immediately to Eumenes, since

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109 Prusias, or Prusia, was king of Bithynia. Pontos, ‘sea’ in Greek, is the name of the Black Sea and its region as well as of a country near Bithynia.
no one doubted that something concerning a peace treaty was written there. Once he had revealed the leader’s ship to his mates, he returned to the same place whence he had set out. 3 But having opened the letter, Eumenes found nothing in it but intentional ridicule of himself. Although, astonished, he sought in vain to ascertain what purpose the letter served, nevertheless he did not hesitate to engage in combat on the spot. 4 In the encounter, all together the Bithynians attacked Eumenes’ ship as Hannibal had ordered. The king, unable to withstand their onslaught, fled seeking safety, which he found only by retreating inside his defensive positions set up on the nearby shore. 5 While the remaining Pergamian vessels were besetting their adversaries rather fiercely, suddenly the Bithynians began to fling into them the earthen pots that we mentioned earlier. At first the missiles gave rise to laughter among the combatants, who could not understand why this was being done. 6 But as soon as they beheld their ships filled with snakes, they were terror-stricken because of this unheard-of thing, especially since they did not know what they could do to dodge it, and so they turned the ships around and returned to their naval camp. 7 Thus Hannibal got the better of the Pergamian arms owing to his stratagem, and not then alone but often on other occasions with infantry troops he routed his foes through similar circumspection.

12 While those events were taking place in Asia, it happened that in Rome Prusias’ envoys were dining at the home of the ex-consul Titus Quintius Flamininus and that when Hannibal’s name came up, one of them said that he was in Prusias’ realm. 2 Flamininus reported it to the senate the next day. The senate fathers, judging that they would never be safe from conspiracy as long as Hannibal lived, sent to Bithynia delegates, including Flamininus, for the purpose of entreaty the king not to harbor their worst enemy and to surrender him to them. 3 Prusias did not dare to say no, but he objected to their asking him to do something in violation of the unwritten law of hospitality; they themselves, if they could, might apprehend him: it would be easy for them to find where he was living. Hannibal in fact dwelt in a single place, a stronghold that the king had given him as a present, and he had constructed exits on every side of the structure: evidently he feared that what in fact happened might occur. 4 When the Roman delegates had arrived there and surrounded his residence with a large number of soldiers, a boy slave on the lookout at one of the entrances told Hannibal that more armed men than usual were in sight. He ordered him to go around to all the entrances in the structure and report to him quickly whether it was invested in the same manner on all sides. 5 Once the boy had promptly informed him of the situation and said that all the exits were beset, Hannibal understood that this had not occurred by chance, but that he was being pursued and that he must cling to life no longer. Refusing to cede it to another’s power and calling to mind his former great achievements, he consumed the poison that he was always wont to keep at hand.

13 Thus this most valiant warrior, having completed many a labor of diverse sorts, came to eternal rest in his seventyeth year. Historians disagree as to who the consuls were when he died. Atticus has written in his annals that he passed away in the consulship of Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Quintus Fabius Labeo,110 but Polybius names Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus,111 whereas Sulpicius Blitho mentions Publius Cornelius Cethegus and Marcus Baebius Tamphilus.112 2 And I add that this great man engaged in such momentous wars devoted part of his time to letters. As a matter of fact, he wrote a certain number of books in

110 183.
111 182.
112 181.
Greek; one of them, addressed to the Rhodians, is on Gnaeus Manlius Volso’s exploits in Asia.  

3 Many authors have handed down to posterity accounts of Hannibal’s wartime feats, but two among them, Silenus and Sosilus the Spartan, were in military service with him and shared his company as long as Fortune allowed it. And furthermore, Sosilus instructed him in Greek.  

4 But it is time for us to bring this book to an end and deal in detail with Roman commanders so that one can judge more readily, after having compared the deeds of both foreigners and Romans, which among these illustrious men deserve preference.
SUGGESTED READINGS

Concerning the biographical genre and Cornelius Nepos, see:

For general information on Cornelius Nepos, consult the introductory matter to these English translations:

The following translation includes the preface to *On Distinguished Generals of Foreign Nations*; its commentary provides valuable information on Nepos as biographer:

Nepos’ lives have long served as standard Latin texts in the classroom. There exist numerous student versions, especially from the late nineteenth century, that offer examples of approaches to language learning in the past and moral education of the young. Among the textbooks aimed at English-speaking students, readers might consult the introductory material and notes to the following:

Facing Latin-French and Latin-German texts provide useful information in their introductions and notes—for example:


Among the biographer’s Greek sources are Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Xenophon’s panegyric of Agesilaus, and Polybius’ *Histories*. Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* provides fuller and, often, different versions of the careers of generals whom Nepos treated a century earlier.
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